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Abstract
This Note examines the complex mechanics of hawala networks. Part I provides informa-
tion regarding their origins, scope and reasons for continued existence. Part II contrasts the U.S.
approach to regulating hawala networks through the USA PATRIOT Act and Operation Green
Quest, with the U.A.E.’s approach, which is resistant to some of the American-led efforts. Part
II also reviews three separate Green Quest actions: 1) Al Barakaat, an expansive Somalia-based
organization through which Somalia’s diaspora sent cash to families abroad; 2) Hussein Alshafei,
an Iraqi American, who operated a money service business to Iraq; and 3) Mohammed Albanna,
a Yemeni-American, based in Lackawanna, New York, who operated a hawala service to Yemen.
Part III is a critical assessment of these American-led efforts to regulate hawala networks. This
Note concludes that regulating hawala operations is indeed necessary, but argues that some of the
U.S. law enforcement efforts as in the Al Barakaat, Alshafei, and Albanna cases are misguided.
This Note proposes that the United States actively develop region-specific hawala networks to
compete with informal systems. By offering tangible alternatives to convince people to switch to
institutionalized banking, the United States would be taking a more international, culturally and
economically sensitive approach
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INTRODUCTION
In its efforts to stymie the flow of funds for terrorists, the
U.S. government has, since September 11th, put a halt to many
hawala operations.1 As the Al Barakaat, Alshafei, and Albanna
cases show, however, these actions have needlessly sideswiped
many civilians with no terrorist involvement, resulting in finan-
cial damages and civil rights violations.2 The U.S. government
* Author's Note: There is little reliable information on hawala networks as few
comprehensive studies have been conducted. Due to the lack of academic material and
case law, this Note relies heavily on the following sources: 1) U.S. Congressional
hearings and Interpol reports for law enforcement perspectives; 2) International
Monetary Fund and World Bank reports for economic perspectives; and 3) news articles
based on anecdotal perspectives.
** J.D. Candidate, 2004, Fordham University School of Law; M.A., School of Ori-
ental and African Studies, University of London; B.A., Cornell University. My deepest
gratitude to the ILJ editors - especially Michele Totah - for their editorial assistance,
to Parag Pathak for his instructive comments, to Carl Stoll for his encouragement, and
to Alexander Boldizar and Kate Johnson for their feedback.
1. See Hearing on the Financial War on Terrorism and the Administration 's Implementation
of the Anti-Money Laundering Provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act Before the U.S. Sen. Comm.
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 15-20 (Jan. 29, 2002) (statement of
Kenneth W. Dam, Deputy Secretary, Treas. Dep't) [hereinafter Dam] (describing U.S.
efforts to stop terrorist financing); Hearing on Hawala and Underground Terrorist Financ-
ing Mechanisms Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Trade and Finance, U.S. Sen. Comm. on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 28-35 (Nov. 14, 2001) (statement of PatrickJost,
SRA International) [hereinafter Jost Statement] (testifying about links between hawala
networks and terrorists). Jost notes that Osama bin Laden is a Saudi national with
connections to Afghanistan and Somalia, countries where hawala is the preferred
means of remitting money. Id. See also Financial Action Task Force on Money Launder-
ing, Combating the Abuse of Alternative Remittance Systems, Int'l Best Practices, June 20,
2003 (agreeing to extend anti-money laundering requirements to alternative remit-
tance systems in October 2001).
2. See General Accounting Office, Terrorist Financing: U.S. Agencies Should Systemati-
cally Assess Terrorists' Use ofAlternative Financing Mechanisms, Nov., 2003, at 3 [hereinafter
Terrorist Financing] (stating that extent to which terrorists use hawala networks is un-
known); Jean-Charles Brisard, Terrorism Financing: Roots and Trends of Saudi Terrorism
Financing, Report prepared for U.N. Security Council, Dec. 19, 2002, 26-28 (describing
practice of zakat as more important source of terrorism funding rather than alternative
remittance systems).
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needs to reassess its understanding and treatment of hawala,3 a
longstanding method of money transfer for Middle Eastern and
South Asian countries that offers its users many advantages.4
This Note examines the complex mechanics of hawala net-
works.5 Part I provides information regarding their origins,
scope and reasons for continued existence. Part II contrasts the
U.S. approach to regulating hawala networks through the USA
PATRIOT Act6 and Operation Green Quest,7 with the U.A.E.'s
3. See Nikos Passas, Informal Value Transfer Systems and Criminal Organizations; A
Study Into So-Called Underground Banking Networks, Hague (1999) [hereinafter Passas 1]
available at http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ea/chinaaliens/ivts.pdf (noting misunder-
standing of hawala networks); Lisa C. Carroll, Alternative Remittance Systems Distinguishing
Sub-Systems of Ethnic Money Laundering in Interpol Member Countries on the Asian continent
(Interpol Paper 2000), available at http://www.interpol.int/Public/FinancialCrime/
MoneyLaundering/EthnicMoney (describing prevalent erroneous information about
hawala networks); Jammaz A-Suhaimi, Saudi Arabia - Demystifying Hawala Business -
Separates Fact from Fiction about the Financial Service That Is Centuries Old, BANKER, Apr. 1,
2002 (correcting common misperceptions about hawala use in Middle Eastern coun-
tries); K Raveendran, UAE Takes Unprecedented Action on Hawala; Emirates License Local
Operators in Bid to Control "Underground" Banking System, DAILY STAR, Oct. 25, 2003, at 5
(reporting about Western misunderstanding of hawala networks).
4. See Patrick M. Jost & Harjit Singh Sandhu, The Hawala Alternative Remittance Sys-
tem and Its Role in Money Laundering, Interpol Rep. (2000), available at http://www.in-
terpol.int/Public/FinancialCrime/MoneyLaundering/hawala (describing hawala net-
works in Middle Eastern countries); Mohammed El Qorchi et al., Informal Funds Trans-
fer Systems: An Analysis of the Informal Hawala System, IMF Occasional Paper No. 222, at 6-
9 (2003) (describing logistics of hawala networks); Samuel Munzele Maimbo, The Money
Exchange Dealers of Kabul: A Study of the Hawala System in Afghanistan, World Bank Rep., at
8-10 (June 2003) (describing logistics of hawala networks in Afghanistan).
5. See John F. Wilson, Hawala and Other Informal Payments Systems: An Economic Per-
spective, IMF Rep., at 2-3 (2002) (showing that hawala networks have different complex-
ity levels, users, and purposes); Carroll, supra note 3 (distinguishing different types of
alternative remittance systems). Carroll defines three such systems: 1) The first trans-
fers money between locations without using formal banks, and honors verbal commit-
ments based on trust; 2) the second involve the issuance of a receipt as proof of a
transaction; and 3) the third system is more a rotating loan association than a remit-
tance method. Id. See also El Qorchi, supra note 4, at 14-15 (describing simple reverse
transactions, complex reverse transactions, bilateral financial settlements, and multilat-
eral financial settlements).
6. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Re-
quired to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat.
272 (2001) [hereinafter "USA PATRIOT Act"].
7. See Treasury Officials on Anti-Terrorism Finance Initiative: U.S. Seeks to Break Up Ter-
rorists'Financial Networks, Oct 25, 2001, available at http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/
terror/01102512.htm (describing mission of Operation Green Quest). Created by the
Treasury Department on October 25, 2001, Operation Green Quest is a multi-agency
anti-terrorist financing task force, aimed at denying terrorist groups access to the inter-
national financial system. Id. The following groups are involved in the task force: De-
partment of Treasury's Customs Service, Internal Revenue Service, Financial Crimes
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approach, which is resistant to some of the American-led efforts.
Part II also reviews three separate Green Quest actions: 1) Al
Barakaat, an expansive Somalia-based organization through
which Somalia's diaspora sent cash to families abroad; 2) Hus-
sein Alshafei, an Iraqi American, who operated a money service
business to Iraq; and 3) Mohammed Albanna, a Yemeni-Ameri-
can, based in Lackawanna, New York, who operated a hawala ser-
vice to Yemen. Part III is a critical assessment of these American-
led efforts to regulate hawala networks.
This Note concludes that regulating hawala operations is in-
deed necessary, but argues that some of the U.S. law enforce-
ment efforts as in the Al Barakaat, Alshafei, and Albanna cases are
misguided. This Note proposes that the United States actively
develop region-specific hawala networks to compete with infor-
mal systems. By offering tangible alternatives to convince people
to switch to institutionalized banking, the United States would
be taking a more international, culturally and economically sen-
sitive approach.
I. WHAT IS THE HAWALA: ORIGINS, EXPLANATION,
AND SCOPE
Although there is some dispute as to the origins of hawala
networks, some variation has existed for centuries. Its long his-
tory is a testament to its effectiveness, as a hawala-type of money
transfer system currently exists in virtually every part of the
world.' Such networks are cost-effective, efficient, far-reaching,
and reliable.' Today, such networks are used primarily by dias-
pora communities, although there is concern that some sectors
of the population use hawala networks to launder money, evade
Enforcement Network ("FinCEN"), Office of Foreign Assets Control ("OFAC"), Secret
Service, Customs. Id. See also Operation Green Quest Overview, available at http://
www.customs.treas.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/pressreleases/archives/2002/22002/022
62002.xml (providing background on Operation Green Quest). Operation Green
Quest also utilizes U.S. Customs Attach6 offices in twenty-six Nations to pursue overseas
leads and develop independent investigations through cooperation with host Nation
governments. Id.
8. See El Qorchi, supra note 4 (describing hawala systems worldwide); Michael
Beebe & Sandra Tan, Yemeni Connection; Arrests Extend to Michigan in Federal Probe of
Money Transfers, BuFALo NEWS, Dec. 19, 2002, at BI (reporting worldwide scope of
hawala use).
9. SeeJost & Sandhu, supra note 4 (illustrating advantages of hawala networks); El
Qorchi, supra note 4 (noting reasons for hawala use); Maimbo, supra note 4 (describing
heavy reliance on hawala networks in Afghanistan).
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taxes, traffic contraband, and fund terrorist activity. 10
A. Origins of Hawala Networks
The word hawala (;.J I .w.) itself comes from Arabic and
has various translations including: "assignment," "change",
"transform" or "promissory note. " " Although most of the litera-
ture terms the hawala broker a "hawaladar," a more accurate
translation is muhauwel-hawala (;.J I _.%J-=).12
A hawala money transfer system exists in virtually every part
of the world."3 The oldest of such systems, called the fei ch'ien,
existed in China during the Tang Dynasty, from 618-907A.D. 4
This money transfer system developed to reduce the inconve-
nience of carrying currency and to facilitate the transfer of funds
10. See El Qorchi, supra note 4 (pointing out illegal uses of hawala networks); Car-
roll, supra note 5 (positing that hawala networks are tied to criminal activity).
11. See S.H. Amin, ARABIC-ENGLISH DICTIONARy OF LEGAL TERMS (1990) (defining
hawala as "assignment"); Jost & Sandhu, supra note 4 (translating hawala as "change"
and "transfer"); See AI-Suhaimi, supra note 3 (defining hawala as "transfer of value"
rather than a "physical transfer").
12. SeeJost & Sandhu, supra note 4 (defining hawaladar as hawala broker); Nikos
Passas, Hawala and Other Informal Value Transfer Systems: How to Regulate Them?, U.S. State
Dep't, Int'l Information Programs, 2003 [hereinafter Passas 2], available at http://
usinfo.state.gov/regional/ea/chinaaliens/shawala.htm (disagreeing with translation of
hawala operator as hawaladar). Wilson, supra note 5, at 6 (disagreeing with hawaladar
designation). Wilson notes that some intermediaries are not just brokers because they
operate on a large scale. Id.
13. See Manuel Orozco, Worker Remittances: An International Comparison, (Inter-
American Dev. Bank, Working Paper Feb. 2003, at 2), available at http://www.iadb.org/
exr/prensa/images/Remittanceslnternational.pdf (last visited May 6, 2004) (describing
use of informal monetary transfer systems worldwide); El Qorchi, supra note 4, at 11, 26
(describing hawala-analogous systems). The black market peso exchange is used in
Latin America, the fei ch'ien in China, the padala in the Philippines, the hui kuan in
Hong Kong and the phei kwan in Thailand. Id.;Jost & Sandhu, supra note 4 (describing
global hawala networks); Beebe & Tan, supra note 8 (citing examples ofJamaican, Mex-
ican, and Puerto Rican immigrants using hawala-like systems to send money to fami-
lies); International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 1999, Released by the Bureau for Int'l
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, Mar. 2000 [hereinafter Int'l
Narcotics Control Report 1999] (describing mechanics of black market peso exchange).
14. See Leonides Buencamino & Sergei Gorbunov, Informal Money Transfer Systems:
Opportunities and Challenges for Development Finance, U.N. DESA Discussion Paper No. 26,
Nov. 2002, at I (describing origins of fei ch'ien system); Ian Angel, Flip Side of the Coin:
Community Currencies and Digital Cash Could Spell the End for Money, FIN. TIMES (London),
Dec. 22, 1997, at 15 (arguing feichien system has been used for generations to bypass
financial regulations). See generally El Qorchi, supra note 4, at 10-11 (stating that hawala
networks facilitated trade between distant regions when conventional banking systems
were weak); Jost & Sandhu, supra note 4 (discussing origins of hawala networks).
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during the prospering tea trade, and was expanded to other
countries by Chinese emigrants. 5
The precise antecedents of hawala in the Middle East are
not well documented. 6 One theory posits that Arab traders
used it as a means of avoiding robbery along the silk trading
route.' 7 Another theory holds that it is an extension of the
money transfer system in existence during the Mughal rule in
India."8 Still other theories hold that it originally developed
from the hundi system as a way for individuals to receive cash
advances.' 9 Regardless of its precise origins, hawala networks
have been integrated in various Middle Eastern and Asian econ-
omies for centuries.20
B. Explanation of Hawala Networks
There are many ways in which hawala networks operate.2'
In the simplest hawala transaction, a hawala broker in one coun-
15. See El Qorchi, supra note 4, at 10-11 (describing how trade growth led to in-
creased reliance on hawala networks). Remittance networks eventually extended from
China to Japan, Russia, and Southeast Asia. Id. See also Buencamino & Gorbunov, supra
note 14, at 2 (propounding different theories on origins of hawala).
16. See El Qorchi, supra note 4, at 11 (stating that history of hawala use in Middle
East is not well documented); Al-Suhaimi, supra note 3 (stating long history of hawala
networks along trading routes of Mediterranean, central Asia, Arabian Peninsula, and
Indian subcontinent).
17. See N.S. Jamwal, Hawala: The Invisible Financing System of Terrorism (2002), avail-
able at http://www.mafhoum.com/press3/111 E62_files/AN-APR402-1 .htm (discussing
role of hawala in terrorist financing) (stating hawala's centuries old existence in India
and other Asian countries); AI-Suhaimi, supra note 3 (describing use of hawala net-
works along various trading routes); El Qorchi, supra note 4 (discussing how hawala
networks facilitated trade and avoided risks of physical cash transportation).
18. SeeJamwal, supra note 17 (stating that Sindhi community developed hundi sys-
tem of money transfer during Mughal rule to avoid dacoity and highway robberies); A-
Suhaimi, supra note 3 (providing brief history of hawala networks).
19. See Passas 1, supra note 3, at 21 (arguing that hundi system of India originally
developed for cash advances); Jost & Sandhu, supra note 4 (describing hundi systems
prevalent in India).
20. SeeJost & Sandhu, supra note 4 (discussing origins of hawala networks); Passas
1, supra note 3, at 9 (positing that hawala networks served people before modern bank-
ing institutions and became integral elements of Asian cultures); AI-Suhaimi, supra note
3 (stating long history of hawala networks along various trading routes in Middle East
and Indian subcontinent); Jamwal, supra note 17 (stating existence of hawala networks
as far back as Mughal rule or silk trading routes); Buencamino & Gorbunov, supra note
14 (describing history of hawala-analogous systems); El Qorchi, supra note 4, at 10-11
(stating that hawala networks have been used for centuries mainly for trade).
21. See Wilson, supra note 5, at 2-3 (showing that hawala networks have different
levies of complexity); Carroll, supra note 3 (distinguishing different types of alternative
remittance systems). See also El Qorchi, supra note 4, at 14-15 (describing various types
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try, takes money from a customer and, for a fee, has an associate
in another country dispense an equal amount to the recipient. 22
The hawala brokers settle their debts with each other daily,
weekly, or monthly, often by a reverse transfer.2' These settle-
ments are sometimes paid in gold. 24 Notably, the hawala brokers
do not physically exchange any money between themselves;
rather, what moves is asset and liability positions.25 A more com-
plex hawala transaction might involve multiple hawala networks
and multiple borders.26
Consider the case of Abdul, a Pakistani taxi driver living in
New York.2 7 He entered the United States on a tourist visa five
of hawala transactions, complex reverse transactions, bilateral financial settlements, and
multilateral financial settlements).
22. See Passas 1, supra note 3 (clarifying logistics of hawala networks); Having Es-
caped Regulation for Ages, Hawala Defies Controls, 13(1) MONEY LAUNDERING ALERT, Nov.
2001, at 14 (describing specific hawala transaction between Afghanistan and Pakistan);
Jost & Sandhu, supra note 4 (explaining logistics of hawala transaction); El Qorchi,
supra note 4, at 6-9 (describing prototypical hawala transaction); Maimbo, supra note 4,
at 6 n.4. (discussing operational characteristics of hawala networks in Afghanistan).
23. See Maimbo, supra note 4, at 13 (documenting that outstanding accounts are
balanced daily, weekly, or monthly);Jost & Sandhu, supra note 4 (describing settlement
process as extended if hawala brokers are repaying existing debts or unable to leave
country). See also Carroll, supra note 3 (writing that hawala brokers generate profits
through exchange rate differentials or commissions).
24. See SANJAY KAPOOR, BAD MONEY, BAD POLITIcs: THE UNTOLD HAWALA STORY 84-
85 (1996) (stating that because gold is often used in settlement, many hawala brokers
work in jewelry business); Douglas Farah, Al Qaeda's Road Paved with Gold; Secret Ship-
ments Traced Through a Lax System in United Arab Emirates, WASH. PosT, Feb. 17, 2002, at
Al (reporting that gold is used because it can be melted, smelted, or deposited without
regulation); Carroll, supra note 3 (stating that debts are frequently settled by gold).
25. SeeJost & Sandhu, supra note 4 (noting that hawala transfers money "without
actually moving it"); El Qorchi, supra note 4, at 18 (noting lack of direct physical cash
transfers between hawala brokers); Wilson, supra note 5, at 14, Fig. 2 (stating that
money is not sent directly in hawala transactions); Carroll, supra note 3 (explicating
that no money physically crosses borders in hawala transactions). The debt between the
two hawala associates is eventually cleared, either by reverse remittances or other
money movement methods. Id.
26. See Passas 2, supra note 12 (arguing that reduced economic asymmetries would
lead to less hawala use); El Qorchi, supra note 4, at 14 (pointing out unlikelihood of
such simple transactions because of asymmetrical remittance flows); Wilson, supra note
5, at 7 (noting that simple, bilateral, reverse hawala with symmetric set of remittances
sent in opposite direction through same intermediaries to be highly unlikely). For in-
stance, millions of subcontinent workers in the Gulf countries send large amounts
home, but there is no obvious reverse flow to balance hawala markets. Id. See also
Carroll, supra note 3 (describing complexity of alternative remittance systems).
27. See Jost & Sandhu, supra note 4 (providing this very example of hawala user);
Jost Statement, supra note 1 (providing other examples of hawala transactions).
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years ago, which has since expired.28  He has saved U.S.$5,000
and he wants to send it to his brother in Karachi.29 Abdul has
several options: He could go to a bank, use a money service busi-
ness such as Western Union, or use a hawala. If Abdul chooses
to use a bank, he would probably have to first open an account
with proper identification, which might be difficult because of
his expired visa." In addition, the bank could charge him the
official exchange rate, an additional charge of at least U.S.$30 to
issue a bank draft to send the money abroad, and it could also
could take a week.31
Abdul might use a money service business such as Western
Union instead, which would also require proper identification.3 2
Western Union limits the number of transactions to Pakistan to
U.S.$2,000 during each thirty-day period, charges U.S.$39 for
each transfer, charges another undisclosed exchange rate fee,
and takes five business days for the transaction. Western
Union would charge him an exchange rate of fifty-six to the dol-
lar, meaning that he pays U.S.$117 for three transfers, plus the
undisclosed exchange rate fee for the same transaction.34
Another option for Abdul is to send money through a
hawala broker. 35 Abdul will be charged anywhere from a 0.25-
28. SeeJost & Sandhu, supra note 4 (describing specific steps that Abdul must take
to send money to Pakistan).
29. See id. (discussing hypothetical of sending money to Pakistan).
30. See Citi.com, Wire Transfers, at http://web.da-us.citibank.com/cgi-bin/citifi/
scripts/prod and-service/prodservdetail.jsp?BVUseBVCookie=yes&BSId=Wire
Transfers&M=S (describing Citibank's ability to transfer funds from United States after
user opens checking account with U.S. address and social security number, driver's li-
cense or state identification, and second form of ID (U.S. passport, military ID or major
bank/credit card)). International transfers cost U.S.$30 and take between two and five
business days, but could be longer depending on the country and its banking policies.
Id.
31. See id. (describing services that Citibank offers to customers).
32. See www.westernunion.com (listing U.S/Pakistan exchange rate at U.S.$1.00 =
PRs56.5087, as of April 18, 2004).
33. See www.westernunion.com (listing rates for transfers to Pakistan). These
figures are calculated according to the website rates listed as of April 18, 2004.
34. See id. (noting that his brother would receive at most, PRs275,931.98, and it
may be delayed).
35. SeeJost & Sandhu, supra note 4 (providing examples of hawala transactions); El
Qorchi, supra note 4, at 7 (describing characteristics of typical informal hawala transac-
tion). See also Hearing on Hawala and Underground Terrorist Financing Mechanisms Before
the Subcomm. on Int'l Trade and Finance, U.S. Sen. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, 107th Cong. (Nov. 14, 2001) (statement of Rahim Bariek, Bariek Money Trans-
fer) [hereinafter Bariek] (explaining logistics of his hawala business). Bariek testified,
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5% commission fee for the transaction.36 The hawala broker will
provide Abdul with a number or code, 7 which Abdul will have
to tell the recipient, his brother.3 8 This hawala broker will con-
tact his associate in Pakistan via telephone, facsimile, or e-mail to
give the equal amount to Abdul's brother upon providing the
correct code.3 9 Using the hawala would allow Abdul to get a bet-
ter exchange rate compared to Citibank and Western Union,40
One of my customers comes to me with $300 and asks to send it to his brother
in Pakistan. Charging about a 5% commission, I take the money and give my
customer a transfer/code number which they give to their family in Pakistan.
They will need that transfer/code number and identification to get the money
from Insaf Exchange. The family member in Pakistan must also sign a form to
show that they received the money. I call and fax Insaf Exchange with the
name of the person who will get the money and the transfer/code number.
Within 24 hours, the money is guaranteed safe in the hands of my customers
family in Pakistan. That is how I do Hawala. Other Hawala brokers may oper-
ate differently. In order to balance our accounts, I pay some of the bills Insaf
Exchange owes to other businesses not located in Pakistan. The money I re-
ceive in the United States never goes directly to Pakistan. But, it does get to
the families in Pakistan that need it.
Id.
36. See Craig S. Smith, For Afghans, the Bank Is Often a Bag of Cash, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
10, 2002, at C5 (reporting that Afghani hawala broker that charged 1% fee for world-
wide transfers); Carroll, supra note 3 (quoting 0.25% to 1.25% fee for legal remittances
and up to 15% to 20% for illegal transactions); Wilson, supra note 5, at 4 (listing hawala
networks' advantages compared to banks, money exchanges, Western Union and
Money Gram); Tom Jackman, Two Men Sentenced in Wiring of Money to Bin Laden Backer,
WASH. PosT, Sept. 12, 2002, at A29 (reporting that Virginia-based hawala broker
charged 4% fee, keeping 1% and sending 3% to Al Barakaat); Christopher Cooper &
Ian Johnson, Ongoing Concerns: Money Network Tied to Terrorism Survives Assault, WALL ST.
J., Apr. 22, 2002, at Al (noting Somalian hawala broker based in Germany charged 5%
fee, keeping 1% and passing 4% on to parent Al Barakaat network). Cf Passas 2, supra
note 26 (asserting that hawala fees can be extortionate in some cases).
37. See Maimbo, supra note 4, at 12 (discussing use of code words in hawala trans-
actions); Jamwal, supra note 17 (noting code word "trouser" for telegraphic transfer,
"recorder" for one lakh rupees, "cassette" for one thousand during investigations in
India); Kapoor, supra note 24, at 105-15 (providing examples of decoded names); Anil
Padmanabhan et al., Hemant Lakhani: Trading in Terror, INDIA TODAY, Sept. 1, 2003, at 34
(describing code in one hawala transfer as U.S.$1 bill with serial number F83616063J).
38. See Maimbo, supra note 4, at 12 (describing some hawala brokers who require
recipient to present code words and secondary identification in hawala transactions);
Kapoor, supra note 24, at 86 (describing situation in which recipient pays amount only
after confirmation that money has been received by recipient).
39. See Jost & Sandhu, supra note 4 (discussing increased e-mail use in hawala
transactions); El Qorchi, supra note 4, at 7 (noting that phone, fax, or e-mail communi-
cation is used between hawala brokers); Carroll, supra note 3 (stating that certain
hawala brokers even offer fund pick-up and home delivery to avoid trails between
banker and client).
40. See Al-Suhaimi, supra note 3 (describing significant differences between official
and unofficial exchange rates in many developing countries).
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and thus, send more money home.4 '
1. Efficiency
If Abdul sends money through the hawala he receives a
guarantee that the money will be delivered more quickly.4 2
Hawala networks are notably efficient, as a hawala remittance
can be completed in a matter of days or even hours in large cit-
ies.43 In contrast, banks or money service businesses usually take
several business days, and could involve additional delays due to
holidays, weekends and time differences." Also, because there
are many places without banks, hawala networks fill a void.4 5
Furthermore, some recipients are illiterate, and do not know
how to cash a check, operate a bank account, or sign for legiti-
mately wired money.46
41. See Cooper & Johnson, supra note 36 (comparing 5% rate charged by Dahab-
shiil hawala with twice that rate by Western Union); Carroll, supra note 3 (quoting
0.25% to 1.25% fee for transfers); Wilson, supra note 5, at 4 (listing hawala networks'
advantages compared to other money service businesses).
42. See Bariek, supra note 35 (testifying at Senate hearing about his use of hawala
networks after wiring money to Pakistan through formal channels failed). Bariek tried
to send money to Pakistan through Maryland-based Chevy Chase Bank, but his money
order was stolen. Id. See alsoJost & Sandhu, supra note 4 (listing multiple advantages of
hawala use); El Qorchi, supra note 4, at 7 (highlighting hawala networks' speed, conve-
nience, versatility, and potential for anonymity); Maimbo, supra note 4, at 12 (discuss-
ing reliability of hawala networks).
43. See El Qorchi, supra note 4, at 7-9 (discussing efficiency of hawala networks as
key reason for their continued use); Mohammad El Qorchi, Hawala: How Does this Infor-
mal Funds Transfer System Work, and Should It Be Regulated?., 39(4) FIN. & DEv., Dec. 1,
2002, at 31 [hereinafter El Qorchi 2] (describing lack of bureaucracy as reason for
hawala's efficiency); Maimbo, supra note 4, at 10 (stating that transferring funds from
Peshawar, Dubai, and London to Kabul usually takes between six and twelve hours); A]-
Suhaimi, supra note 3 (discussing lack of delays in hawala transactions).
44. See Motoo Noguchi, Help Needed for the "Unbanked", WASH. POST, Mar. 26, 2004,
at A23 (contrasting hawala's 24/7 service with bank money transfers, which can take
three to five days);Jost & Sandhu, supra note 4 (describing potential delays with formal
banking system); www.westernunion.com, supra note 32 (describing fees and delays in
Western Union transfers).
45. See El Qorchi, supra note 4, at 7-9 (describing advantages of hawala); Carroll,
supra note 3 (relating broad reach of hawala networks); Passas 2, supra note 12 (report-
ing that hawala networks reach isolated areas that are deemed unprofitable for banks to
open branches).
46. See A1-Suhaimi, supra note 3 (discussing education level and fear of banks as
reasons for dependency on hawala networks); Carroll, supra note 3 (stating that hawala
are popular because of their ability to serve remote Asian locations); Noguchi, supra
note 44 (describing hawala use for those have no access to banks such as those along
Pakistan-Afghan border); Subhash Mishra, Azamgarh: Talk of the Town, INDtA TODAY,
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2. Cost-Effectiveness
The hawala network is cost-effective not only for the user,
but also for the operator, because many hawala brokers already
conduct businesses where money transfers are necessary.
4 7
Hawala brokers often operate out of an import/export busi-
nesses, travel agencies, or jewelry shops.48  These rented
storefronts have lower overhead costs because they are without
vaults or alarm systems. 49
To illustrate a more complex transaction, Abdul will give
U.S.$5,000 to a hawala broker who runs an import/export busi-
ness to send to a family member in India.5 0 This hawala broker
will tell his contact in India to pay U.S.$5,000 to the Indian fam-
ily and then under-invoice a shipment to her contact by sending
him U.S.$20,000 worth of telecommunications devices but only
invoice him for U.S.$15,000.5 1 In this way, he is paying him the
Oct. 7, 2002, at 49 (describing Indian diaspora in Middle East who use hawala because
official channels are too cumbersome and time-consuming).
47. See Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, A Report to the Congress in Accordance
with Section 359 of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Re-
quired to Intercept and Obstruct Act of 2001, (Nov. 22, 2003) at 11-12 [hereinafter Report to
the Congress] (reporting that U.S.-based hawala brokers often work in conjunction with
legal enterprises that deal in large sums of cash, such as transmitters, check cashers,
jewelry businesses or grocery stores); Jost & Sandhu, supra note 4 (listing businesses
such as import/export, travel, jewelry, foreign exchange, rugs/carpets, used cars, car
rentals telephones/pagers as more likely to be involved in hawala transactions); Carroll,
supra note 3 (noting that hawala system is intertwined with gold smuggling and money
movement through import/export invoicing manipulation).
48. SeeJost & Sandhu, supra note 4 (listing businesses that are likely to be involved
in hawala transactions); Kapoor, supra note 24, at 84-85 (stating that many hawala bro-
kers are in jewelry business because gold is often used in settlement); Carroll, supra
note 3 (stating links between hawala transfers and gold smuggling).
49. See Cooper &Johnson, supra note 36 (describing Somali hawala broker in Ger-
many who worked out of McDonalds fast food restaurant, conducting about 2,000 fi-
nancial transactions, and moving about U.S.$1.2 million to African countries in late
1990s); El Qorchi, supra note 4, at 8 (discussing low overhead costs for some hawala
brokers); Carroll, supra note 3 (stating that hawala brokers have lower overhead costs
than banks, enabling them to exchange at better rates than official exchange rates).
50. See Terrorist Financing, sup-a note 2, at 9-15 (reporting that terrorists use mecha-
nisms such as charities, informal banking systems, bulk cash and commodities such as
precious stones and metals);Jost & Sandhu, supra note 4 (providing example of hawala
transaction within export/import business); Carroll, supra note 3 (noting that hawala
transfers can be disguised in invoicing of imports and exports).
51. See Wilson, supra note 5, at 15, Fig. 4 (describing how hawala transactions work
within export businesses); Having Escaped Regulation For Ages, Hawala Defies Controls,
supa note 22 (arguing that grocery stores and other legitimate businesses, where cash
can be picked up or dropped off, often function as foreign "affiliates" of hawala bro-
kers); Ancient Underground Banking System, Hawala, Surfaces in U.S., 7(9) MONEY LAUN-
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U.S.$5,000 that he owes him. 2 In order to move money from
India to the United States, his contact would over-invoice a ship-
ment." Using the existing business allows the hawala brokers to
create a paper record, which authenticates the transaction and
satisfies reporting requirements. 5 4
3. Trust
The primary features of hawala networks that distinguish it
from other remittance systems are trust 55 and the extensive use
of family or regional relationships. 56 A hawala broker in any
given region or country tends to be known to members of the
same family, village, clan, or ethnic group and is likely to speak
the same language. 57 As one commentator noted, the under-
DERING ALERT, June 1996, at 6 (describing 1996 NJ. federal case involving two Indian
brothers who moved more than U.S.$5 million through corporate accounts).
52. SeeJost & Sandhu, supra note 4 (showing how export/import business masks
money transfers); See Dep't of the Treasury & Dep't of Justice, National Money Launder-
ing Strategy 2003, at 42 [hereinafter Nat'l Money Laundering Strategy 2003] (noting that
trade provides counter valuations in hawala networks); Passas 1, supra note 3, at 22
(positing that hawala and mis-invoicing have been used extensively for tax evasion and/
or capital flight).
53. See Nat'l Money Laundering Strategy 2003, supra note 52, at 42 (recognizing that
over-invoicing disguises illicit fund transfers); Passas 2, supra note 12 (noting that over-
invoicing of exports is one form of hawala transaction); Andres Rueda, International
Money Laundering Enforcement & the USA PATRIOT ACT of 2001, 10 MICH. ST. U.J. INT'L
L. 141, 178 (2001) (describing how corporate fronts, banking vehicles, legitimate im-
port-export business use over-invoicing to layer dirty money).
54. See Rueda, supra note 53, at 178 (stating that individuals can transfer funds
abroad and avoid taxes with documentation by using over-invoicing); Jost Statement,
supra note 1 (testifying about over or under-invoicing scams); Carroll, supra note 3 (dis-
cussing logistics of remittance systems within existing business frameworks).
55. See Maimbo, supra note 4, at 12 (stating reliability of hawala networks). This
World Bank study examined hawala networks in Afghanistan, and found that the remit-
ter often paid the hawala broker only after the recipient confirmed receipt of the
money, indicating a strong honor system in place. Id. Cf Carroll, supra note 3 (report
ing that contracts are adhered to primarily because parties fear punishment or death).
But see Passas 2, supra note 12 (arguing that notion of retributive violence as baseless
assertion); Passas 1, supra note 3, at 28 (concluding that trust, rather than fear and
violence, makes hawala networks function according to interviews with hawala users).
Passas argues that hawala networks hardly fit the Western description of "gangs." Id.
56. See Passas 2, supra note 12 (stating that trust is defining element of hawala
transactions); Al-Suhaimi, supra note 3 (emphasizing trust and integrity features of
hawala);Jost & Sandhu, supra note 4 (discussing trust component of hawala networks);
Bariek, supra note 35 (testifying about importance of trust before U.S. Senate). Bariek
stated, "Let me emphasize - I know all of my customers, and I would never send
money for a family that I do not know." Id.
57. See Jost & Sandhu, supra note 4 (describing family relationships or regional
affiliations as feature of hawala networks); Carroll, supra note 3 (asserting that underly-
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standing is, "You pay me here, my Uncle will pay you there."58
Many expatriate communities, which tend to be predominantly
male, will use a trusted hawala broker, who is known in the vil-
lage accountable to it and aware of social norms to protect wo-
men from directly dealing with banks and other institutions.5 9
Any cheaters will usually be punished by ex-communication,
which is the equivalent of an economic death sentence.60
4. Lack of Paper Trail
Unlike institutional banking, hawala networks make mini-
mal use of written records; rather, transfers of money take place
based on verbal communications.6' Because it is rare for hawala
brokers to keep records of individual transactions, it is unlikely
that either the sender or recipient will ever be identified.6 2 Re-
ing characteristic common to hawala networks of Asia/Pacific region is strong cultural
sense of honor and trust); A-Suhaimi, supra note 3 (noting that trust is important be-
cause satisfied existing customers refer expatriate workers to hawala brokers).
58. Kapoor, supra note 24, at 85 (emphasizing trust as premier feature of hawala
networks). See also Carroll, supra note 3 (asserting that strong familial or cultural ties
are pillars of every hawala transaction).
59. See El Qorchi 2, supra note 43 (describing hawala networks as based on na-
tional, ethnic, and village solidarity); Passas 1, supra note 3, at 20 (describing tradition
of migrant workers who met needs of European economies and sent back home money
to support their families).
60. SeeJost & Sandhu, supra note 4 (describing honor system within hawala net-
works); Passas 1, supra note 3, at 27 (stating that violation of trust brings about shame,
ostracism, and dishonor within family); Carroll supra note 3 (writing that broken trust is
tantamount to community ostracism and economic suicide).
61. See El Qorchi, supra note 4, at 14 (clarifying that money does not "simply sub-
merge[ ] on one side of a border and pop[ ] up in a village on the other side"). Many
features of hawala transactions resemble other kinds of formal transactions. Id. See also
Wilson, supra note 5, at 5 (noting press distortion of hawala system, and arguing its
similarity to other types of transactions); Passas 2, supra note 12 (arguing that hawala is
similar to older and contemporary "conventional" banking practices). Cf Jost Statement,
supra note 1 (emphasizing differences between hawala transactions and formal bank-
ing). Jost testified,
The most significant investigative barrier is probably the fact that 'hawala be-
havior' lies well outside the cultural experience of most U.S. investigators.
Hawala is a system where large amounts of money are handed over without
receipts, confirmation numbers, or identification. Hawala transactions take
place in the context of a large network unlike a "traditional" corporate struc-
ture. The business of hawala is conducted informally, with little in the way of
overhead and almost nothing in the way of a regulatory infrastructure, making
it, in this respect, nearly the antithesis of banking.
Id. (emphasis added).
62. See Maimbo, supra note 4, at 12 (maintaining that there are no standard docu-
mentary requirements for conducting hawala transactions). Each hawala broker, how-
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mittances recoided by hawala bankers are often insubstantial
and encrypted in the banker's personal handwriting. 63 Moreo-
ver, many hawala networks are difficult to trace because they op-
erate out of existing businesses.64
Figure 1 below is a sample hawala bookkeeping record.65
The first column is the date of the transaction.6 6 The second is
the name of the hawala broker to whom the debt is owed. The
third column is the amount of the debt.6 7 The fourth and fifth
columns indicate the dollar/rupee exchange rate in effect for
the transaction and the value of the transaction in dollars.68 The
sixth column reflects the way in which the payment was made.69
ever, may develop their own system, such as a hawala slip, customer identification, ac-
counting records. Id., at 12-13. See also Carroll, supra note 3 (stating that receipts may
take many forms including torn bank notes, marked notes, and chops, which are Chi-
nese carved seals used as ink stamps); Passas 2, supra note 12 (noting that hawala bro-
kers keep some details of clients, such as payment instructions, names, telephone num-
bers, addresses at least until accounts are settled); Kapoor, supra note 24, at 92-128
(reprinting records of hawala payments between Dubai, India, and London); Having
Escaped Regulation for Ages, Hawala Defies Controls, supra note 22 (reporting that transmit-
tance receipt can be as simple as postcard torn in half).
63. See Kapoor, supra note 24, at 92-96 (writing of SurinderJain scandal in India).
This scandal involved a hawala broker who paid nearly U.S.$18 million in bribes to 115
public officials of top ranks of Indian politics. Id. Diaries seized during the investiga-
tion revealed codes in jotted initials and numbers that were difficult to decipher. Id.
See also Having Escaped Regulation for Ages, Hawala Defies Controls, supra note 22 (stating
that investigators rarely find detailed accounts as in Jain hawala scandal).
64. See Jost & Sandhu, supra note 4 (describing many hawala brokers operating
within existing businesses such as import/export, travel, jewelry, foreign exchange,
rugs/carpets, used cars, car rentals, and telephones/pagers); Report to the Congress, supra
note 47, at 11-12 (reporting that hawala brokers often work in money transmitting busi-
nesses, check cashing, jewelry businesses or grocery stores); Terrorist Financing, supra
note 2, at 9-15 (reporting that terrorists use mechanisms such as charities, informal
banking systems, bulk cash, and commodities such as precious stones and metals).
65. See Jost & Sandhu, supra note 4 (using same example to illustrate sample
hawala records). See also Kapoor, supra note 24, at 92-97 (providing copies of actual
hawala records from Jain hawala scandal).
66. See Kapoor, supra note 24, at 92-97 (showing that actual hawala records have
fewer columns and are more difficult to decipher); Report to the Congress, supra note 47,
at 12 (describing records as insubstantial, written in idiosyncratic shorthand, and lack-
ing key information such as amounts, names, or times).
67. See Matt Miller, Underground Banking; in Pakistan, Other Third World Nations, 24
(1) INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Jan. 1, 1999, at 32 (noting that there are 1,110 identified
hawala brokers in Pakistan and transactions run as high as U.S.$10 million). But see
Passas 1, supra note 3, at 10 (arguing that informal systems cannot easily handle sub-
stantial amounts of money generated by illegal enterprises).
68. See www.bloomberg.news (reporting currency exchange rate at U.S.$1 =
IRs43.88 as of April 18, 2004).
69. See Jost & Sandhu, supra note 4 (providing explanation of column entries).
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The notation "52t" for Ganesh Trading represent fifty-two tolas
of gold, possibly used instead of remitting the money through a
bank.7 °
Figure 1: Sample Hawala Bookkeeping Record
Dollar/Rupee
Hawala Broker Amount of Exchange Value in
Date Owed Debt Rate U.S.$ Method
16/6/98 Vinod 100,000 37.6 2659.57 F-1202
16/6/98 Nitin Bhai 350,000 42.3 8274.23 B-8146
17/6/98 DK 50,000 38.75 1290.32 F-1204
17/6/98 SK 300,000 39.25 7643.31 B-8147
17/6/98 Anil 200,000 40.1 4987.53 S-5428
18/6/98 Ganesh Trading 200,000 38 5263.15 52t
C. Modern Scope of Hawala Networks
Hawala networks in many countries are openly advertised,
and legal.71 But given its unregulated nature, it is difficult to
characterize these networks generally.72 They serve a diverse cli-
Notations such as "F-1202" usually represent a bank ("F" might be "First Bank"; "B" and
"L" would represent other banks) and the check number. Id. See also Terrorist Financ-
ing, supra note 2, at 29 (describing non-transparency and indecipherable transaction
records as characteristic of alternative remittance systems); Report to the Congress, supra
note 47, at 12 (citing language and cultural barriers as obstacles to understanding
hawala records).
70. See Int'l Narcotics Control Report 1999, supra note 13 (describing gold as primary
medium of exchange in certain transactions). Many monetary transactions to South
Asia involve gold for two reasons: first, the combined historical, religious and cultural
importance gold enjoys in the region; and second, the increasing distrust in the value of
local currencies. Id. See also Farah, supra note 24 (reporting on frequent use of gold in
India).
71. See Nat'l Money Laundering Strategy 2003, supra note 52 (noting that hawala net-
works are unregulated in some countries); Raveendran, supra note 3 (reporting legality
of hawala networks in United Arab Emirates); Jost & Sandhu, supra note 4 (docu-
menting instances in which South Asian American newspapers hawala openly advertise
hawala services); Passas 1, supra note 3, at 8 (suggesting that because hawala networks
are not "underground" in many regions, the term "informal value transfer systems" is
more appropriate). Cf. Carroll, supa note 3 (stating that while hawala services are
sometimes openly advertised, most serve select covert clientele).
72. See Carroll, supra note 3 (describing hawala-like systems worldwide). Alterna-
tive remittance systems function in Australia, Bahrain, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia,
Israel,Japan, Kuwait, Malaysia, Nepal, New Zealand, Oman, Pakistan, People's Republic
of China, Republic of Korea, Republic of the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Thai-
land, Turkey, and Vietnam. Id. These systems are diverse, have a wide range of clients,
the nature of the trust bond varies, the way profits are generated varies, and the degree
to which systems leave proof of their profits and dealings is unknown. Id.; Wilson, supra
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entele, and thrive in both rich7" and in less developed coun-
tries."
Millions of immigrants, migrant workers, and refugees use
hawala networks to send money home to relatives.75 According
to the World Bank, the total value of money remitted to develop-
ing countries in 2002 reached at least U.S.$80 billion, a figure
double the aid provided by the combined total of government
aid, private bank lending and International Monetary Fund
("IMF") or World Bank aid and assistance.76 India and Mexico
note 5, at 10 (discussing barriers to measuring number, scale, and magnitude of hawala
networks); Passas 1, supra note 3, at 54-59 (pointing out lack of reliable estimates about
scope of informal banking networks, but noting their prevalence in Asia and Africa); El
Qorchi, supra note 4, at 18-19 (reporting macroeconomic implications of unrecorded
remittances).
73. See United Arab Emirates, Comment & Analysis, Middle East Review World of
Information, Oct. 8, 2003, at 1 (discussing United Arab Emirate's wealth and preva-
lence of hawala use);Jost & Sandhu, supra note 4 (documenting extended hawala use
in United Arab Emirates); Raveendran, supra note 3 (reporting Dubai as key point in
global hawala networks due to expatriate workers and businessmen).
74. See Maimbo, supra note 4, at 9 (documenting more than 300 registered money
exchange dealers and between 500 to 2,000 unregistered money exchange dealers with
no limit on the volume of transfers allowed in Afghanistan); El Qorchi, supra note 4, at
26 (stating that informal hawala networks have thrived where formal banking sector is
absent or weak).
75. See Liz Stuart, Monthly Cheques Home from Migrant Workers Are Building Prosperity:
Analysis, THE GUARDIAN (London) Apr. 12, 2004, at 23 (reporting findings of Harvard
study that 1 million Indians living in United States, equivalent to only 0.1% of India's
population, earn 10% of India's national income by sending money to India); The
Money Go-Round, NEw ZEALAND HERALD, May 10, 2003 (discussing diaspora communities
reliance on remittance transfer systems); AI-Suhaimi, supra note 3 (positing that hawala
networks in Middle East mainly cater to needs of large underprivileged expatriate
worker communities); Bariek, supra note 35 (testifying about money transfer business,
which primarily serves Pakistani diaspora). Bariek's hawala network supplies 200 to 300
customers, who generally send money to Pakistan once a month. Id. Bariek testified:
[W]ithout the money families send from the U.S. and other countries, many
of the families in Pakistan would not be able to pay rent or afford food and
other basic needs. Families also send larger sums of money - between $1,000
and $5,000 - for weddings, when someone passes away and other big events.
For all of these reasons, I consider my job very important and humanitarian in
nature.
Id.
76. See Dilip Ratha, Workers' Remittances: An Important and Stable Source of External
Development Finance, World Bank Global Dev. Fin., at 159 (2003) (quantifying worldwide
remittance values); The Money Go-Round, supra note 75 (citing World Bank statistics); El
Qorchi, supra note 4, App. II, at 35 (calculating amount of informal remittances in
billions); Orozco, supra note 13 (estimating that annual remittances may amount to
more than U.S.$100 billion, and that present data is incomplete and underreported);
El Qorchi, supra note 4, App. II, at 33-40 (estimating informal remittance values in
select countries); Stuart, supra note 75 (noting that British government could almost
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were the largest recipients of remittances from the United
States, receiving U.S.$10 billion each.77 Pakistan estimated that
hawala networks could account for approximately U.S.$3 billion
entering Pakistan, compared with only U.S.$1 billion via the for-
mal banking system.7 s
1. Infrastructure
Hawala networks offer a service to those who cannot other-
wise send money to their relatives due to political situations79 or
weak infrastructure.8s For example, after the 1947 India-Paki-
scrap its non-disaster related aid budget altogether if it were to put a policy in place
which made it cheaper and easier to remit).
77. See Ratha, supra note 76, Fig. 7.3. (stating that South Asia was largest recipient
of recorded remittances, measuring nearly 2.5% of GDP in 2001); U.S. Says Grave Laun-
dering, Corruption Ills Plague Many Nations, 15(6) MONEY LAUNDERING ALERT (Apr. 2004)
at 15 (reporting that 30% of India's gross national product originates from hawala net-
works); Orozco, supra note 76 (reporting growth of remittances by Latin American dias-
pora); El Qorchi, supra note 4, at 35-40 (estimating remittances for Algeria, Ban-
gladesh, India, Iran, Pakistan as extremely high).
78. See Ratha, supra note 76, at 159 (discussing inefficiencies in formal banking
systems that lead diaspora communities to use informal remittance systems). The
United States and Saudi Arabia are the largest sources of workers' remittances to devel-
oping countries and South Asia is the largest recipient of remittances relative to GDP
size in 2001. Id.; Michelle Cottle, Eastern Union; Hawala v. the War on Terrorism, NEW
REPUBLIC, Oct. 15, 2001, at 24 (reporting annual hawala remittances into Pakistan was
between U.S.$2.5 billion and U.S.$3 billion versus only U.S.$1 billion via banks); The
Money Go-Round, supra note 75 (discussing worldwide scope of diaspora remittances);
Douglas Frantz, The Financing: Ancient Secret System Moves Money Globally, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
3, 2001 (reporting that U.S.$2-$5 billion moved through hawala system annually in Pa-
kistan, more than amount of foreign transfers through its banking system); El Qorchi,
supra note 4, at 35 (showing unrecorded remittances outweighed recorded remittances
in Pakistan, Algeria, Bangladesh, and Iran); 'Wilson, supra note 5, at 18 (estimating that
hawala transfers to Pakistan is high).
79. See Maimbo, supra note 4, at 8-10 (describing almost complete reliance on
hawala networks in Afghanistan); El Qorchi, supra note 4, at 12 (stating dependence of
informal money transfer systems in war torn-countries); Lourdes M. Leslie, U.N. Reps
Listen to Somalis' Concerns; Money-Wiring Difficulties Continue, International Delegation is
Told, STAR TRJB., Oct. 18, 2002 (describing Somalian diaspora reliance on hawala net-
works). See also Cottle, supra note 78 (describing increased hawala use after Pakistan
faced global condemnation for testing nuclear weapons in 1998). Cottle reports that
money flowing into Pakistan through official channels from overseas workers dropped
from U.S.$150 million a month to U.S.$50 million, as hawala essentially replaced banks.
Id.
80. See Hearing on Hawala and Underground Terrorist Financing Mechanisms Before the
Subcomm. on Int'l Trade and Finance, U.S. Sen. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, 107th Cong. 26-35 (Nov. 14, 2001) (statement of Dr. Tarik M. Yousef, Professor,
Dep't of Economics, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown Univ.) [hereinafter
Yousef] (expressing concerns about realities of regulating hawala networks). Yousef
testified, "so long as their remains a divergence between the US and other countries in
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stan partition, currency exchange between Pakistan and India
was banned, and hawala, also called hundi1 or chitthi,8 2 played a
vital role.8" During the Vietnam War, many Americans used
hawala to send money to the United States through Indian
merchants in Saigon. 4
The Afghani population too, has internally relied on hawala
for years, especially because the country just opened its first in-
ternational private-sector bank able to take international transac-
tions in September 2003.85 The U.S. government ironically, has
found that the only effective way to transfer funds into Afghani-
financial development, banking efficiency, taxation levels and laws pertaining to for-
eign exchange transfers, there will exist a demand for the Hawala and other means of
moving money across the globe." Id.; Bariek, supra note 35 (testifying that hawala ful-
fills important need for diaspora communities).
81. SeeJost & Sandhu, supra note 4 (translating hundi as bill of exchange, promis-
sory note, trust, reference, and alternative remittance system). Hundi comes from the
Sanskrit root meaning "collect," and is used to refer to the collection box found in a
Hindu temple. Id. See also Carroll, supra note 3 (distinguishing hundi from hawala).
Carroll defines hawala as international, without negotiable instruments, and associated
with criminal activities, while hundi is local, issues written receipts that can be physically
carried across India's borders to neighboring countries and exchanged for local cur-
rency. Id. See also Miller, supra note 67, at 33-37 (explaining hundi money transfers).
Miller writes that a Bombay businessman would visit his local hawala dealer before em-
barking on a trip to Pakistan. Id. He would sell the dealer Indian rupees and receive,
in return, a coded piece of paper or a torn rupee note and a contact address. Id. Upon
landing in Karachi, the businessman would proceed to the address, hand over the pa-
per or note and pick up his Pakistani currency, who has written on the subject. Id.
82. See Passas 1, supra note 3, at 24-25 (documenting that British colonists intro-
duced chit system in China). British colonists borrowed the term from chitthi, which in
Hindi means a "note." Id. In the chit system, British workers would write chits to pay for
food and other essentials from local merchants. Id. In turn, the merchants would pre-
sent these chits for payment to the Chinese comprador, who would then deduct the
corresponding amounts from the British accounts. Id. The chit system enabled British
workers to avoid carrying cash or bulky commodities. Id. See also Buencamino &
Gorbunov, supra note 14, at 9 (describing origins of chit system).
83. See Cottle, supra note 78 (discussing use of hawala networks after partition); El
Qorchi, supra note 4, at 10 (stating that virtually no payment between India and Paki-
stan was transacted through banks after partition).
84. SeeJost & Sandhu, supra note 4 (stating that many Americans took advantage
of hawala services to remit money through Indian merchants in Saigon); Passas 1, supra
note 3, at (noting resurgence of hawala in Southeast Asia during Vietnam War); Buen-
camino & Gorbunov, supra note 14, at 9 (describing hawala use during Vietnam War
when increased demand for foreign exchange in black market).
85. See Victoria Burnett, Afghanistan to Grant Licenses to First Foreign Banks in Years,
FIN. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2003, at 14 (reporting that these new banks will accept deposits
and perform international money transfers for first time); Maimbo, supra note 4, at 8
(describing Afghanistan's weak infrastructure and eighty-year history of hawala net-
works).
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stan to aid in its reconstruction is to use existing hawala net-
works, e.g., no other financial infrastructure exists. 86 In addi-
tion, many Iranian Americans depend on hawala networks to
send money to relatives in Iran because of sanction limitations.87
In countries with these types of infrastructure limitations, hawala
services help residents of the remitting country to send money,
medicine and other goods to relatives.88
2. Capital Controls
Several Middle Eastern and South Asian countries have laws
that prohibit capital flight, prohibit foreign exchange transac-
tions at anything other than the official rate of exchange, and
impose strict licensing requirements on money remitters and
foreign exchange dealers.8s One of the attractions of hawala
networks is to evade these regulations.9' Thus, hawala networks
86. See Maimbo, supra note 4, at 9 (estimating that aid groups have moved at least
U.S.$200 million through Afghani hawala networks since fall of Taliban); Michael M.
Phillips, Afghan Aid Flows Through Dark Channels: U.S. Is Forced to Move Funds in Money-
Transfer Networks Used by Terror Groups, WALL ST. J., Nov. 12, 2002 (reporting that Bush
administration has used hawala networks to distribute aid in Afghanistan while simulta-
neously working to regulate such systems); Burnett, supra note 85 (reporting arrival of
first international banks in Afghanistan); EricJ. Gouvin, Bringing Out the Big Guns: The
USA PATRIOT Act, Money Laundering, and the War on Terrorism, 55 BAYLOR L. Rv. 955,
978 n.106 (2003) (discussing U.S. reliance on hawala transactions in Afghanistan).
87. See Edward Hegstrom, Iranian Exiles In Quandary, HousT. CHRON., May 5, 2003,
at 14 (describing dilemma for Iranian diaspora who may not trust Iranian banks); Car-
roll, supra note 3 (stating that many immigrants have fundamental mistrust of govern-
ment and central banking systems). See also Office of Foreign Assets Control, Sanctions
Program and Country Summaries, Iran, available at http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/
eotffc/ofac/sanctions/sanctguide-iran.html (explaining limitations on sanctions on
Iran).
88. See Marc Kaufman, Somalis Said to Feel Impact of U.S. Freeze of Al Barakaat, WASH.
POST, Nov. 30, 2001, at A30 (reporting that Somalia's largest single source of income is
money sent from relatives abroad); Maimbo, supra note 4, at 8 (describing heavy reli-
ance on hawala networks by communities abroad); Yousef, supra note 80 (presuming
that most individuals utilizing hawala in United States do so for legitimate reasons); El
Qorchi, supra note 4, at 12 (stating that hawala networks offer services in remote re-
gions).
89. See Yousef, supra note 80 (stating financial systems of most Muslim countries
are unsophisticated). Yousef testified that extensive government intervention in certain
societies through excessive taxation, foreign exchange, and trade restrictions have re-
tarded the emergence of modern financial systems. Id. See alsoJost Statement, supra note
1 (explaining that capital flight regulations lead to increased use of hawala networks);
Passas 2, supra note 12 (suggesting additional channels for fund transfers to reduce
economic asymmetries); Wilson, supra note 5, at 11 (giving example of Philippines as
successful in regulating hawala due to improvements in formal banking channels).
90. See Wilson, supra note 5, at 8 (describing currency controls as reasons for
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offer a ready means of moving money to bypass such regula-
tions." From the government's perspective, this undermines
the economy or at least the government's economic plans, as the
unregulated nature of hawala networks translates into lost reve-
nues and taxes and the increased potential for criminal activity.92
3. Cultural-Religious Reasons
Many people use hawala networks for cultural-religious rea-
son because under Islamic law, the use of certain banking sys-
tems is considered sinful if it makes interest from money.93 The
Qu'ran encourages followers to build financial relationships
based on trust rather than contract.94 Hawala networks then, are
hawala use); Passas 1, supra note 3, at 22 (arguing that hawala brokers make their profit
from substantial differences between black market rates and official rates). Passas ar-
gues that hawala brokers can get a better rate by selling the hard currency in the black
market particularly when government interventions impose artificial exchange rates,
when there are currency controls, in cases of high inflation, during periods of political
instability. Id.; Miller, supra note 67, at 32-37 (arguing that hawala use becomes vital to
economies when financial system is in crisis); Follow the money, ECONOMIST, June 1, 2002
(reporting that hawala is "boon" for poorer people remitting money home).
91. See Jost & Sandhu, supra note 4 (writing that money launderers violate cur-
rency control laws by using hawala networks); Yousef, supra note 80 (describing hawala
use as market response).
92. See Maimbo, supra note 4, at 25 (describing lost economic revenue from unreg-
ulated hawala transfers); El Qorchi supra note 4, at 14-21, 26-27 (discussing economic
costs of unregulated money transfers); Orozco, supra note 13 (estimating that annual
worldwide remittances may equal more than U.S.$100 billion).
93. See Hegstrom, supra note 87 (reporting use of hawala because Muslims believe
it sinful to collect interest on loans); Barbara L. Seniawski, Riba Today: Social Equity, the
Economy, and Doing Business Under Islamic Law, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 701, 702-12
(2001) (describing Qur'anic prohibition of riba to prevent usurious conditions in ex-
changes and loans); MichaelJ.T. McMillen, Islamic Shari'ah-Compliant Project Finance: Col-
lateral Security and Financing Structure Case Studies, 24 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 1184, 1213 n.31
(2001) (describing hawala under Shari'ah law). McMillen explains,
[T]he Islamic contract of hawala contemplates a situation where a creditor, A,
assigns to his own creditor, C, a debt which is owed to A by B. In order for this
contract to be effective as a contract of hawala, the amount owed to A by B
must equal exactly the amount owed by A to C. Furthermore, A must be in-
debted to C and B must be indebted to A at the time the contract of hawala is
concluded. The contract of hawala may not relate to future indebtedness, a
particularly thorny issue in an ongoing funding regime for a project financing.
Id. See also Mian Ahad Hayaud-Din, The Hawallah Network: Culture and Economic Develop-
ment In Afghanistan, 78(1,2) Ir'L Soc. SCIENCE REv., June 22, 2003, at 21 (describing
Islamic principles involving hawala).
94. See Hegstrom, supra note 87 (reporting that Qu'ran encourages financial rela-
tionships based on trust rather than contract); Shi'a Islamic laws on hawala according
to the Fatawa of Ayatullah al Uzama Syed Ali al-Husaini Seestani, available at http://
www.al-islam.org/laws/transactions3.html#2298 (last visited May 9, 2004) (describing
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used by millions of Muslims who are simply following Qu'ranic
scripture and cultural norms.95 In other words, the hawala net-
work is a financial system governed by cultural values and relig-
ious tenets. 9 6
4. Illegal Purposes, including Terrorism
Finally, other sectors of the population use hawala networks
for illegal purposes.9 7 Because they offer privacy and lack a pa-
per trail, hawala networks serve as vehicles to launder money,
evade taxes, and traffic contraband.9 8 U.S. law enforcement au-
thorities have recently targeted hawala networks fearing that
they were being used by terrorist financing operations.9 9 The
basic rules of hawala transfers). See also English translation of one set of hawala rules by
Iran's Grand Ayatollah Fazel Lankarani, available at http://www.lankarani.org/En-
glish/onlinepub/tawdhih-al-masael/draft.htm (last visited May 9, 2004). See also
Brisard, supra note 2, at 12-15 (describing legal almsgiving practice of zakat required of
Muslims).
95. See Bruce Crumley, Follow the Money; Is the Islamic Hawala Exchange System Being
Used to Bankroll the Al Qaeda Terror Network?, TIME, Nov. 19, 2001, at 43 (describing inter-
est-free hawala as exemplary of Islamic world's unique approach to international fi-
nance); John C. Lyman, Cultural Defense: Viable Doctrine or Wishful Thinking?, 9 CRIM.
JUST. J. 87, 143 (1986) (propounding cultural defenses to negate or mitigate criminal
responsibility where acts are based on actor's cultural heritage, religion, or tradition).
96. See Hayaud-Din, supra note 93 (describing hawala as culturally ingrained and
clashing with Western ideals). Because of the economic infrastructure and instability in
Afghanistan, Hayaud-Din argues that a centralized banking system based in Kabul
would never integrate as well as hawala networks. Id.
97. See e.g. Kapoor, supra note 24 (describing use of hawala in notorious corrup-
tion scandal in India); Carroll, supra note 3 (describing illegality pervasive in alternative
remittance systems); Jamwal, supra note 17 (discussing role of hawala in terrorist financ-
ing in Kashmir); Jost & Sandhu, supra note 4 (stating that terrorists in India used
hawala network to transfer funds); El Qorchi, supra note 4, at 12-13 (listing illegal activi-
ties associated with hawala networks); Maimbo, supra note 4, at 14 (stating that hawala
is vulnerable to money launderers and those seeking to finance terrorism); Passas 2,
supra note 12 (listing crimes associated with informal value transfer systems).
98. See Int'l Narcotics Control Report 1999, supra note 13 (identifying hawala networks
as key in money laundering and financial crimes in South Asia). The report describes a
1999 investigation into international alien smuggling ring into the United States that
relied on hawala networks. Id. But see Wilson, supra note 5, at 10 (stating hawala remit-
tances have "little to do with underground or illicit economic activity"); Passas 1, supra
note 3, at 10 (positing that hawala-related crime may be exaggerated given that they are
one of numerous systems used by money launderers).
99. See Dam, supra note 1 (describing American efforts to stop terrorist financing);
Ilias Bantekas, Current Development: The International Law of Terrorist Financing, 97 AM. J.
INr'L L. 315, 328-29 (2003) (describing ease with which terrorist money infiltrates legiti-
mate or illegitimate money); Meenakshi Ganguly, A Banking System Built for Terrorism,
TIME, Oct. 25, 2001, available at http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,
178227,00.html (reporting links between hawala networks and terrorism). But see Ter-
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scrutiny on hawala networks became especially urgent after U.S.
officials discovered that several of the September 11th hijackers
had received U.S.$110,000 through a financial institution in the
United Arab Emirates. 00
While it is undisputed that Osama bin Laden's financial
strength was a factor in the execution of the September l1th
attacks,' 0 ' there is some debate as to the extent of his reliance on
hawala networks.'0 2 U.S. officials have estimated the costs of ex-
rorist Financing, supra note 2, at 3 (characterizing U.S. government's battle against ter-
rorist financing as weak). The General Accounting Office ("GAO") reports that the
extent to which terrorists use alternate financing mechanisms is not known and faults
the U.S. government for poor understanding of methods terrorists use, weak intelli-
gence gathering, and lack of rigorous analysis and data sharing. Id. See also Having
Escaped Regulation for Ages, Hawala Defies Controls, supra note 22 (pointing out that com-
mercial banks, wittingly and unwittingly, have helped Osama bin Laden transfer funds);
Jost & Sandhu, supra note 4 (stating that hawala transactions are often disguised within
other legitimate business activity).
100. See Judy Pasternak & Stephen Braun, Emirates Looked Other Way While Al Qaeda
Funds R7owed; Finance: For years the Persian Gulf Country Shrugged Off Warnings from U.S.
Officials About Money Laundering, L.A. TraEs, Jan. 20, 2002, at Al (detailing money trans-
fers between U.A.E banks and U.S. banks). An Al Barakaat branch in the United Arab
Emirates wired U.S.$9,485 to a Florida SunTrust bank account in the names of Marwan
A1-Shehhi and Mohamed Atta, the leader of the September 1 th hijacking operation.
Id. On August 30, 2000, U.S.$19,985 was wired and on September 18, 2000,
U.S.$69,985 was wired to that account. Id. See also David Olinger, The Bucks Stop, Start
Here: Open Climate in Arab Emirates Made Transfers Easy for Terrorists, DENrVER POST, Feb.
24, 2002, at 8 (reporting that Florida SunTrust bank generated suspicious activity re-
port for largest amount, U.S.$69,000, but was lost in myriad transactions reported by
U.S. banks); Brisard, supra note 2, at 9 (positing that hawala system is an "end user" tool
rather than primary tool or instrument for moving money).
101. See Robert O'Harrow,Jr. et al., Bin Laden's Money Takes Hidden Path to Agents of
Terror; Records Hint at Complex Financial Web, WASH. POST, Sept. 21, 2001, at Al 3 (report-
ing bin Laden's wealth at U.S.$300 million); Adam Cohen, How Bin Laden Funds His
Network, TIME, Oct. 1, 2001, at 63 (discussing bin Laden's wealth); Ganguly, supra note
99 (reporting on terrorists' reliance on hawala networks); Crumley, supra note 95 (re-
porting that Mohamed Atta received cash wire transfers from suspected bin Laden op-
erative); Farah, supra note 24 (reporting that part of U.S.$500,000 used to fund attacks
came from Dubai).
102. See Brisard, supra note 2, 26-28 (describing practice of zakat as primary source
of terrorism funding rather than alternative remittance systems). For example, Saudis
contribute approximately U.S.$10 billion per year in zakat donations to more than 240
charities in the form of bank transfers. Id. Brisard notes the "severe internal resistance
from its religious branch to act decisively against funding [terrorist] networks." Id. See
also Terrorist Financing, supra note 2, at 3 (stating that extent to which terrorists use
hawala networks is unknown); Public Hearing of the Nat'l Commission on Terrorist Attacks
Upon the United States, Apr. 1, 2003 (statement of Lee S. Wolosky, Boies, Schiller &
Flexner, LLP) (testifying that Al-Qaeda and other Islamic terrorist groups have taken
advantage of zakat). Wolosky testified that many Muslims donate at least 2.5% of their
income [zakat] to prominent, trusted community leaders or institutions, who then com-
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ecuting the September l1th attacks at approximately
U.S.$500,000.1' But, much of the funding of Al Qaeda and
other terrorist networks was obtained legally.'04 Fund-raising ac-
tivities of Al Qaeda allegedly have run the gamut from ostrich
farms and shrimp boats in Kenya, to forestland in Turkey, to dia-
mond trading in Africa and agricultural holdings in Tajikis-
tan.10 5 Simply put, terrorists have used both institutionalized
and informal banking systems. 10 6
II. REGULATING THE HAWALA
Although there are a host of laws that attempt to regulate
informal banking systems in the United States, this Note only
discusses post-September 11 th provisions in the USA PATRIOT
Act.107 U.S. law enforcement officials have used USA PATRIOT
Act provisions to regulate hawala networks in the Al Barakaat
mingle and disperse donated moneys to persons and charities they determine to be
worthy. Id. Passas 2, supra note 12 (positing that hawala networks are not only or main
vehicle of illegal or terrorist funds).
103. See Don Van Natta Jr., Terrorists Blaze a New Money Trail, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28,
2003, at Al (reporting that September 1Ith attacks cost an estimated U.S.$500,000; the
attack on the American destroyer Cole in October 2000 was estimated at U.S.$5,000 to
U.S.$10,000; the October 2002 bombing of Bali nightclub cost approximately
U.S.$74,000); Dan Eggen & Kathleen Day, U.S. Ties Hijackers'Money to Al Qaeda; Investi-
gators See Cash Trail as Key, WASH. POST, Oct. 7, 2001, at Al (describing links between A
Qaeda terrorist network and September l1th hijackers). Two men with names similar
to that of two of the hijackers brought U.S.$14,000 and U.S.$20,000 in bulk cash and
declared these amounts to Customs. Id.
104. See Carroll, supra note 3 (noting that hawala system is intertwined with gold
smuggling and money movement through import/export invoicing manipulation);
Bantekas, supra note 99, 315-18 (describing how terrorists use both legitimate and ille-
gitimate funds);Jamwal, supra note 17 (stating that funding terrorism through hawala
comprises miniscule part of overall black economy in India).
105. See O'Harrow, supra note 101 (reporting on Al Qaeda fundraising activities);
Brisard, supra note 2, at 3 (pointing out that Al Qaeda revenues come primarily from
legal sources).
106. See Nat'l Money Laundering Strategy 2003, supra note 52, at 42-43 (recognizing
that hawala networks intersect with traditional financial institutions for terrorist finan-
ciers to obtain currency); Ganguly, sup-a note 99 (discussing elusive nature of hawala
networks); Daniel Williams, Swiss Probe Illustrates Difficulties in Tracking Al Qaeda's Cash,
WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 2001, at A19 (discussing "infinite" channels in hawala networks).
But see Brisard, supra note 2, at 8-9 (arguing that hawala systems are not main tool for
moving terrorist money).
107. See Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, Combating the Abuse of
Alternative Remittance Systems, Int'l Best Practices, June 20, 2003 (agreeing to extend anti-
money laundering requirements to alternative remittance systems in October 2001);
Report to the Congress, supra note 47, at 6-10 (describing Bank Secrecy Act provisions); El
Qorchi, supra note 4, at 24 (listing other laws such as Money Services Act that require
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case, the Alshafei case, and the Albanna case.108 After September
1lth, the United Arab Emirates also began to license and regu-
late hawala networks. 10 9 There are, however, shortcomings in
each State's respective laws, policies, and practices.1 °
A. The Laws in the United States
1. USA PATRIOT Act
On October 26, 2001, six weeks after the September 11th
attacks, President George W. Bush signed into law the Uniting
and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Re-
quired to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, more
commonly known as the USA PATRIOT Act.1 ' The USA PA-
TRIOT Act recognizes that "money laundering, and the defects
in financial transparency on which money launderers rely, are
critical to the financing of global terrorism and the provision of
funds for terrorist attacks."' 12 Title III of the USA PATRIOT Act,
entitled the International Counter-Money Laundering and Fi-
nancial Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001, addresses illegal money
laundering and terrorist financing.113
Although the USA PATRIOT Act does not specifically use
the term "hawala," it implicates hawala networks in several provi-
licensing provisions for certain money services businesses in United States); Maimbo,
supra note 4, at 21 (describing legislation that addresses hawala networks).
108. See Kaufman, supra note 88 (describing Al Barakaat hawala shutdown);
Florangela Davila & Ray Rivera, U.S. Urged to Drop Trade-Ban Case Man's Company Helped
Iraqi People, Supporters Say, SEATrLE TRIB., Apr. 22, 2003, at BI (reporting on charges
against Hussein Alshafei); Dan Eggen, 3 N.Y. Men Arrested for Money Transfers; Nearly
$500,000 Allegedly Sent to Yemen, WASH. PosT, Dec. 18, 2002, at A2 (describing charges
against Mohammed Albanna).
109. See Paul Beckett, Informal Money-Movement System in UAE Is Likely Uncontrollable,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 12, 2001, at A6 (reporting on U.A.E. government's hawala regula-
tions).
110. See Critics Question US Tools Against Terror Funding, KHALEEJ TIMES, Feb. 7, 2004
(criticizing USA PATRIOT Act provisions); Raveendran, supra note 3 (describing short-
comings with U.S. hawala regulations).
111. See USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). See alsoJ.M.
Lawrence, War on Terrorism; Anti-Terror Laws in Place; Feds Urgently Implement Crackdown,
BosT. HERALD, Oct. 27, 2001, at 5 (reporting that USA PATRIOT Act was swiftest-mov-
ing bills in federal history due in part to sense of vulnerability after attacks). Lawrence
reports that that USA PATRIOT Act was rushed because many lawmakers were preoccu-
pied with anthrax contamination and had less opportunity to consider legislation fully.
Id. See also Bantekas, supra note 99, at 328-29 (discussing swift U.S. reaction to Septem-
ber 11th in passing USA PATRIOT Act).
112. See USA PATRIOT Act § 302 (a)(2).
113. See id., at tit. III.
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sions. t 4 For instance, it re-defines "financial institution," to in-
clude "any person that engages as a business in the transmission
of funds, including any person who engages as a business
through an informal money transfer system or any network of
people who engage as a business in facilitating the transfer of
money domestically or internationally outside of the conven-
tional financial institutions system."115 Under this definition, a
hawala operation could now be considered a financial institution
and subject to various regulations and due diligence require-
ments.
1 1 6
In other words, the USA PATRIOT Act makes it unlawful to
run an unlicensed international money transmittal business, and
eliminates the requirement that the operator should have
known about the licensing requirement.1 1 7 Second, the USA PA-
TRIOT Act mandates that such financial institutions report cash
transactions of over U.S.$10,000 and complete suspicious activity
reports ("SARs")for certain cash transfers."" Moreover, struc-
turing the sum into amounts less than U.S.$10,000 would be ille-
gal.1 9 Furthermore, the USA PATRIOT Act requires certain fi-
nancial institutions that operate outside of the United States to
conduct "special measures" of record-keeping and reporting.1 2 0
114. See id., at §§ 359, 373. See also BSA Gets Great Expansion in Coverage, Reach and
Strength, 13(1) MONEY LAUNDERING ALERT, Nov. 2001, at 5 (discussing USA PATRIOT
Act provisions that expand definition of "financial institution" to include underground
banking systems, such as hawala and requires all "financial institutions" to maintain
anti-money laundering programs).
115. See USA PATRIOT Act § 359.
116. See id., at § 373. See also Having Escaped Regulation For Ages, Hawala Defies Con-
trols, supra note 22 (recognizing that although hawala is not mentioned by name, its
description as financial institution subjects it to Treasury Department regulations);
Charles Doyle, The USA PATRIOT Act: A Legal Analysis, CRS Rep. for Cong., Apr. 15,
2002, at 30 (describing USA PATRIOT Act provisions that require financial institutions
to implement due diligent policies, procedures, and controls).
117. See USA PATRIOT Act § 373(b) (1) (A).
118. See id., at § 359. See also Int'l Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 2003 Released by
the Bureau for Int'l Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (Mar. 2004) (listing indica-
tors of suspicious activity: frequent domestic and international ATM activity, even dollar
deposits or transfers, no known source of income, use of wire transfers to move funds to
and from high risk geographic locations, frequent address changes, occupation "stu-
dent," purchases of military items or technology, and media reports on suspected/ar-
rested terrorists or groups).
119. See USA PATRIOT Act §§ 321, 356. See also Doyle, supra note 116, at 25
(describing provisions that require financial institutions to track anyone who transports
more than U.S.$10,000 into or out of United States).
120. See USA PATRIOT Act § 311. See also Doyle, supra note 116, at 27-29 (describ-
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Finally, other provisions allow the United States to freeze assets
from hawala networks. 21  The proposed VICTORY Act 122 seeks
to further strengthen the USA PATRIOT Act.
2. Operation Green Quest
Operation Green Quest, a multi-agency financial enforce-
ment task force formed on October 25, 2001, augments the "ex-
isting counter-terrorist efforts by bringing the full scope of the
government's financial expertise to bear on systems, individuals,
and organizations that serve as sources of terrorist funding."123
As early as four months after the September 11th attacks, Opera-
tion Green Quest agents made arrests and froze more than
U.S.$80 million in assets. 124 The United States also designated
ing provisions that require certain institutions that pose money laundering risks to keep
more extensive records); Angela D. Hardister, Can We Buy Peace on Earth?: The Price of
Freezing Terrorist Assets in a Post-September 11 World, 28 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 605,
620-21 (2003) (describing extraterritorial reach of USA PATRIOT Act provisions).
121. See USA PATRIOT Act §§ 315-316, 319-20, 371, 373, 376, 806.
122. See Draft Copy of The Vital Interdiction of Criminal Terrorist Organizations
Act 2003, S., 108th Cong. 103 [hereinafter "VICTORY Act"], available at http://www.
libertythink.com/VICTORYAct2.pdf (last visited May 6, 2004). The proposed VIC-
TORY Act explicitly mentions "hawalas," and states that a "transfer of funds shall be
considered to involve the proceeds of specified unlawfully activity" if it is "part of a set
of parallel or dependent transactions, any one of which involves the proceeds of speci-
fied unlawful activity." Id.; Dan Eggen, GOP Bill Would Add Anti-Terror Powers, WASH.
POST, Aug. 21, 2003, at A3 (describing lower standards for convicting defendants of
money laundering through hawala networks in proposed VICTORY Act).
123. See Treasury Officials on Anti-Terrorism Finance Initiative U.S. Seeks to Break Up
Terrorists' Financial Networks, supra note 7 (discussing U.S.-led initiatives); Dam, supra
note 1 (describing composition of financial antiterrorism task force known as Green
Quest); Bantekas, supra note 99, at 329 (discussing formation of Operation Green
Quest). See also President Announces Crackdown on Terrorist Financial Network, Remarks of
Pres. George Bush (Nov. 7, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/re-
leases/2001/11/20011107-4.html (quoting President Bush's strategy). He stated:
The United States is pressing the war against terror on every front. From the
mountains of Afghanistan to the bank accounts of terrorist organizations. The
first strike in the war against terror targeted the terrorists' financial support.
We put the world's financial institutions on notice: if you do business with
terrorists, if you support them or sponsor them, you will not do business with
the United States of America.
Id.
124. See Dam, supra note I (describing successes of law enforcement efforts); Ed-
mund L. Andrews, Traces of Terror: The Money Trail; White House Denies Report Qaeda Funds
Are Rowing, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2002, at A10 (describing international cooperation in
freezing funds); Michael M. Phillips & Ian Johnson, US.-European Divisions Hinder Drive
to Block Terrorists' Assets: Some Countries Identify Few Targets Except Those That Are of Local
Interest, WALL ST. J., Apr. 11, 2002, at Al (reporting that governments worldwide have
clamped down on assets of alleged terrorist groups). The United States has blocked
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over 315 terrorist-related entities and began freezing their as-
sets. 125 Two years after the attacks, more than U.S.$136.8 mil-
lion has been frozen around the world due in part to the efforts
of Operation Green Quest.1 26  The U.S. Treasury Department
claims that Al Qaeda's annual budget has shrunk to U.S.$5-10
million from U.S.$35 million before September l1th. 1 27 As of
July 31, 2003, however, the U.S. government had only frozen
U.S.$719,832 in Al Qaeda assets. 128
U.S.$34 million in assets allegedly tied to terrorism, the Europeans U.S.$35 million and
other countries another U.S.$35 million).
125. See Nat ' Money Laundering Strategy 2003, supra note 52, at 5 (discussing specific
progress made in stopping terrorist financing). The report states that since September
11th, the estimated worldwide total of assets with possible terrorist links seized is over
U.S.$60 million. Id. See also Hearing on the Role of Charities and NGO's in the Financing of
Terrorist Activities, Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Trade and Fin., Comm. on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs, 107th Congress 6-14 (Aug. 1, 2002) (statement of Kenneth W. Dam,
Deputy Secretary, Treas. Dep't) (testifying that since September 11 th, the United States
has designated seven foreign charitable organizations as linked to Al Qaeda, has shut
down two prominent U.S.-based charities with alleged ties to Osama bin Laden and
Taliban, and seized at least U.S.$2.4 million in charitable funds); Kurt Eichenwald, U.S.
Freezes Assets of 2 Groups, for Diverting Gifts to Al Qaeda, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2002, at A17
(discussing U.S. freezing efforts).
126. See Josh Meyer, Cutting Money Flow to Terrorists Proves Difficult; Nations at the
Heart of Al Qaeda's Network Lack Financial Safeguards, and the Global Alliance Is Weaker; Cells
Are Now Deeper Underground, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2003, at 1 (describing results of Opera-
tion Green Quest); Beckett, supra note 109 (reporting that U.A.E. government has com-
plied with several U.S. requests to freeze bank accounts including twelve accounts alleg-
edly related to Al Barakaat hawala network). But see Hardister, supra note 120 (criticiz-
ing U.S. freezing of assets as overreaching).
127. See Van Natta, supra note 103 (quoting U.S Treasury Department's general
counsel about decrease in Al Qaeda funds); Fact Sheet: Shutting Down the Terrorist Finan-
cial Network, Press Release by Office of the Press Secretary, Executive Office of the Presi-
dent (Nov. 7, 2001) available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/pressreleases/2001/11/
print/20011107-6.html [hereinafter Fact Sheet], (stating that U.S. government had
blocked over U.S.$26 million in assets of Taliban and Al Qaeda and other Nations had
blocked at least U.S.$17 million); Nat'l Money Laundering Strategy 2003, supra note 52, at
34-36 (discussing specific indictments against charities that provided material support
to terrorists). But see Mohamed Nimer, Muslims In America After 9-11, 7J. IsLAMIc L. &
CULTURE 1, 28-29 (Fall 2002 / Winter 2003) (discussing freezing assets of Islamic chari-
ties). Nimer argues that shutting down religious charities because of suspicion that
some of its associates or recipients have extreme political views is a form of discrimina-
tory profiling. Id.
128. See Terrorist Financing, supra note 2, at 24 n.44 (reporting that U.S. govern-
ment had only frozen U.S.$719,832 in Al Qaeda assets as of July 31, 2003). The GAO
reports that the frozen funds are rough indicators of the extent of terrorist financial
flows, but U.S. government officials have not been able to provide indicators about
terrorist assets outside of formal mechanisms. Id. See also Ron Howell, Cash Lifeline Cut;
Terror Law Hampers Unlicensed Money Transfer Companies, NEWSDAY, Jan. 5, 2004, at A3
(describing prosecutions of dozens of Middle Eastern and South Asian immigrants for
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Despite these successes, critics have argued that the USA
PATRIOT Act provisions 29  and Operation Green Quest ef-
forts13 0 are inadequate to regulate hawala networks. First of all,
financial institutions are already saddled with enormous finan-
cial reporting and due diligence requirements.13 1 Moreover,
even with the extra reporting requirements, some critics have
running unlicensed hawala brokers). Howell reports that in December 2003, a federal
jury in Brooklyn convicted a Yemeni immigrant, Ali Kassim Kassim of conducting an
unlicensed money transmitting business, part of a hawala network. Id. More than a
dozen other Yemeni-born men have pleaded guilty to participating in that network, but
none of these hawala prosecutions involved charges of terrorism. Id.
129. See Terrorist Financing, supra note 2, at 4 (reporting that U.S government faces
challenges to monitoring alternative financing mechanisms in terms of accessibility,
adaptability of terrorists and competing priorities); Gauvin, supra note 86 (arguing that
increased reporting requirements could hinder criminal investigations). Gauvin writes,
"The art of intelligence gathering has always hinged on the ability of analysts to sepa-
rate the wheat from the chaff, or to find the useful signal hidden in the distracting
noise of information. Adding more noise is unlikely to make that task easier." Id. See
also Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, Criminal Law: the Tenuous Relationship Between the Fight
Against Money Laundering and the Disruption of Criminal Finance, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRiMi-
NOLOGY 311, 380 (arguing that traditional law enforcement cannot detect non-tradi-
tional criminal financial activity); George A. Lyden, The International Money Laundering
Abatement and Anti-Terrorist Financing Act of 2001: Congress Wears a Blindfold While Giving
Money Laundering Legislation a Facelift, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 201 (arguing that
U.S. efforts are substantially ineffective in war on terrorism).
130. See Howell, supra note 128 (reporting increased use of official means, such as
banks and other licensed institutions, rather than hawala networks to send money). A
spokesperson at the Pakistani mission to the United Nations said remittances through
official channels such as banks and other licensed institutions have dramatically risen in
the past two years. Id. Roughly U.S.$300 million was sent through U.S. institutions in
the year before September 11th, compared with U.S.$2.1 billion in the past year. Id.
See also Michael M. Phillips, U.S. Says It Cut Off Up to $20 Million in Al Qaeda Funds, WALL
ST. J.,Jan. 29, 2002, at A22 (stating that approximately 8,500 hawalas and other money-
service businesses have registered with federal government since new regulations). But
see Cottle, supra note 78 (arguing that crackdown has pushed terrorist activity further
underground); Van Natta, supra note 103 (reporting that terrorists may have become
more savvy at hiding money); Hardister, supra note 120, at 64142 (describing resistance
to U.S. freezing efforts).
131. See Eggen & Day, supra note 103 (reporting scope of paperwork require-
ments). Large banks might typically handle 10,000 to 125,000 wire transfers per day,
and about 70% are for amounts less than U.S.$500,000. Id. See also Lyden, supra note
129, at 231 (stating that extra paperwork for banks is "virtually useless"); Bradley Skol-
nik, Reining in Wall Street Regulators, CHICAGO TRIB., July 7, 2003, at 17 (describing USA
PATRIOT Act's anti-money laundering provisions as cumbersome and costly). Skolnik
comments that these regulations have spawned a cottage industry of law firms offering
expensive seminars and services to help brokerages navigate these new regulations. Id.
The regulations affects small business and of the NASD's 5,300 member firms, about
50% have only ten or fewer registered people and approximately 75% have no more
than fifty brokers. Id. Each new regulation adds to the cost of transactions on Wall
Street, which are borne out by investors. Id.
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posited that the new USA PATRIOT Act provisions would not
have prevented the September l1th disaster. 13 2 Because the
nineteen hijackers had opened twenty-four domestic bank ac-
counts at four different banks with deposits averaging between
U.S.$3,000 and U.S.$5,000, well below the U.S.$10,000 reporting
requirement limit, a financial institution would not have de-
tected anything.'33 Furthermore, there was reportedly no unu-
sual activity in those accounts that would have alerted authorities
under even the most intense scrutiny.'
Law enforcement authorities, too, will have to process a
monumental amount of paperwork from these financial institu-
tions.'35 Even if they rely on SARs, they will have difficulty in
detecting terrorist activity.'3 6 Furthermore, critics hold that fi-
132. See Eggen & Day, supra note 103 (reporting that banks did not make error in
failing to follow guidelines for detecting or reporting suspicious activities); Passas 2,
supra note 12 (arguing that "knee jerk" law enforcement response to regulating hawala
is inadequate because many terrorists use formal banking networks).
133. See Third Public Hearing of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the
United States, July 9, 2003 (statement of Rohan Gunaratna, Head of Terrorism Research,
Inst. for Defense and Strategic Studies, Singapore) (stating that despite Western efforts
to regulate formal banking systems, underground unregulated banking networks have
grown larger); Eggen & Day, supra note 103 (reporting that two alleged hijackers de-
clared U.S.$14,000 and U.S.$20,000 in bulk cash to Customs, but did not raise suspi-
cions); Bantekas, supra note 99, at 321 (noting that several hijackers opened bank ac-
counts without social security numbers).
134. See How Two Dates Transformed Money Laundering Field Worldwide, 13 (12) MONEY
LAUNDERING ALERT, Oct. 2002, at 1 (arguing that money laundering provisions in USA
PATRIOT Act were bills that had been pending in Congress for years). These bills were
designed primarily to detect traditional money laundering scenarios rather than terror-
ist financing. Id. See also Cooper & Johnson, supra note 36 (reporting that German
officials discovered hawala activity in one instance without relying on any money laun-
dering laws). The hawala broker regularly performed his transactions at the same Mc-
Donald's restaurant and eventually drew the attention of security guards. Id. The
guards called the police, who got permission to wiretap his phones, which revealed his
work for Al Barakaat. Id.
135. See Terrorist Financing, supra note 2 (reporting that FinCEN officials had insuf-
ficient resources to draft regulations under USA PATRIOT Act). The new provisions
imposed regulations on many financial institutions that were not previously subject to
comprehensive anti-money laundering regulations, such as automobile and boat deal-
ers, pawn brokers, and dealers in precious metals, stones, or jewels. Id. This requires
time and resources to study and consult with law enforcement and industry leaders. Id.
See also Eric Lichtblau & Timothy L. O'Brien, U.S. Struggles to Track How Terrorists Finance
Their Operations, INT'L HERALD DAILY TRIB., Dec. 13, 2003, at 2 (noting difficulty of trac-
ing terrorist money especially when funds are transferred in small amounts).
136. See Izzidin Hussein Razem, Post-9/11 Rule Changes Leaving Banks with Tougher
Choices, MONEY LAUNDERING ALERT, Jan. 2004 (finding problematic that banks provide
SARs when financial investigations units lack competent and experienced staff); How
Two Dates Transformed Money Laundering Field Worldwide, supra note 134 (questioning
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nancial institutions are not well trained at distinguishing be-
tween money laundering and terrorist financing.
3 7
Finally, many hawala brokers simply will not register without
stronger incentives. 138 Notably, other countries such as India,
where hawala use is illegal but rampant, have been unsuccessful
in regulating it. 139 Thus, while the United States mandates addi-
tional compliance and identification verification measures, crit-
ics have argued that the new requirements fail to convince peo-
ple to switch to the formal banking system.14 °
customer identification requirements given that U.S. agents are "baffled" with Arabic
names); Cottle, supra note 78 (quoting one former Clinton Treasury official, "If you can
even find a hawala broker to interview, one, you'll be doing better than the FBI").
137. See Report to the Congress, supra note 47, at 16 (urging better education for law
enforcement and financial businesses on hawala networks); Jost Statement, supra note 1
(suggesting more efficient ways to regulate hawala networks); Skolnik, supra note 131
(commenting that problems are with enforcement rather than legislation); Critics Ques-
tion US Tools Against Terror Funding, supra note 110 (critiquing USA PATRIOT Act provi-
sions because they rely on same tactics used to detect money laundering, which is prob-
lematic given that terrorists often deal in much smaller sums than money launderers).
138. See Maimbo, supra note 4, at 21 (noting that many Afghani hawala brokers
interviewed stated they had no incentive to declare their activities for external monitor-
ing). Even if it were possible, their transactions are so varied it would be impossible to
develop a consistent set of guidelines and standards. Id. See also Hayaud-Din, supra
note 93 (criticizing attempts to implement Western model of centralized banking given
that "the Hawallah system reaches into the remotest regions of the [N]ation more
quickly, cheaply, and efficiently than any modern bank in the industrialized world");
Wolosky, supra note 102 (testifying that because hawala activity is intended to be with-
out record-keeping or paper trails, the likelihood that individuals will register is quite
remote); Nithin Belle, Hawala Racket Continues to Fox Authorities, KHALEE TIMES, Feb. 18,
2004 (reporting on unsuccessful attempts by Indian government to regulate hawala op-
erations). A big obstacle is that hawala premiums offer 5-7% of official exchange rates.
Id. See also Nigel Morris-Cotterill, Fraud - Is the Big Clean-up a Wash Out? - Nigel Mor-
ris-Cotterill Assesses the Initiatives Introduced in the Past Year to Counter Money Laundering and
Corporate Fraud, BANKER, Oct. 1, 2002 (arguing that USA PATRIOT Act impinges on
privacy of overseas customers).
139. See Int'l Narcotics Control Report 1999, supra note 13 (estimating that size of
underground economies in South Asia are 50-100% that of "documented" economies);
Cottle, supra note 78 (reporting that other Nations such as India have tried to regulate
hawala unsuccessfully); Kapoor, supra note 24 (describing unsuccessful verdict in politi-
cal corruption scandal involving hawala transactions). Cf Wilson, supra note 5, at 11
(describing successful attempt to regulate hawala networks in Philippines). Hawala use
in the Philippines, which has millions of expatriate workers and migrants, has de-
creased mainly as a result of improvements and cost reductions for banking channels,
and also unification of the exchange rate. Id.
140. See Beckett, supra note 109 (reporting that legitimate wire-transfer and bank-
ing services would become an attractive alternative if countries abolished controls that
restrict currency flows); Maimbo, supra note 4, at 21 (describing heavy reliance of
hawala networks throughout Afghanistan because of lack of other alternatives); Passas
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B. The Laws in the United Arab Emirates
In the United Arab Emirates, a federation of seven indepen-
dent States, there are fifty banks to serve three million re-
sidents. t4 ' Within Dubai alone, there are at least 113 money ex-
change stations, and eighty unlicensed but legal hawala opera-
tors recognized and legitimately used.1 42  One reason for
hawala's popularity in the United Arab Emirates is the large ex-
patriate population who uses hawala networks to send money
home. 143
The U.S. Treasury Department has specifically identified
Dubai, Pakistan, and India as the "hawala triangle," because peo-
ple living in these regions rely heavily on hawala networks. 14 4 Af-
ter September 11 th, the United States heavily scrutinized U.A.E.
hawala networks because two of the hijackers, Mohammed Atta
and Marwan Al Shehhi, reportedly received more than
U.S.$120,000 from banks in the United Arab Emirates in
2000.145 Furthermore, the United States has focused on the
1, supra note 3, at 69 (noting that after Philippine government abolished currency ex-
change controls in 1995, official remittances quadrupled).
141. See Middle East Review World of Information, supra note 73 (discussing preva-
lence of hawala use in United Arab Emirates); Timothy L. O'Brien, U.S. Focusing on
Dubai As a Terrorist Financial Center, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2003, at 13 (describing new focus
on Dubai after September llth); Olinger, supra note 100 (providing background on
hawala prevalence in United Arab Emirates); Raveendran, supra note 3 (reporting
heavy hawala use in United Arab Emirates).
142. See Olinger, supra note 100 (reporting large number of unlicensed hawala);
O'Brien, supra note 141 (noting legitimacy of hawala in United Arab Emirates);
Raveendran, supra note 3 (reporting that Western countries lack appreciation of
hawala's long historical existence).
143. SeeJost & Sandhu, supra note 4 (stating reasons for extended hawala use in
United Arab Emirates). Laborers from South Asia make up about half the U.A.E.'s
population and rely on hawala to send money home. Id. Dubai's large gold market is
the source of much of the gold sent (licitly and illicitly) to India and Pakistan. Id. See
also O'Brien, supra note 141 (reporting on Dubai's large expatriate labor force);
Raveendran, supra note 3 (reporting Dubai as key point in global hawala network due
to expatriate workers and businessmen). Hawala use often takes the form of flight of
capital resulting from exchange controls, regulations against outflow of funds and
other policies followed by many Asian countries. Id.
144. See O'Brien, supra note 141 (reporting that this hawala triangle forms back-
bone of system that abets terrorism); Jost & Sandhu, supra note 4 (discussing illegality
of hawala in India and Pakistan).
145. See Pasternak & Braun, supra note 100 (reporting that some hijackers wired
approximately U.S.$18,000 to U.A.E. account); Beckett, supra note 109 (describing
U.S.$110,000 wire transfers between U.A.E. banks and U.S. banks). Immediately,
before the attacks, three of the suspected hijackers used a Boston-based Western Union
to send U.S.$5,000 and for U.S.$5,400 to U.A.E. bank. Id. But see UAE Defends Hawala
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United Arab Emirates because it, along with Pakistan and Saudi
Arabia, had diplomatic ties with the Taliban government.'6
In response to this heightened scrutiny, the United Arab
Emirates has implemented new banking rules and regulations. 11 7
Despite American scrutiny however, the United Arab Emirates
has been resistant to Western regulatory efforts.148 In fact, the
U.A.E. Central Bank Governor Sultan bin Nasser Al Suwaidi has
continued to openly defend the legitimacy of hawala net-
works. 149  Al Suwaidi denies that the United Arab Emirates is
solely to blame for the financing of the September 11th terror
attacks, and alleges that the United States is equally to blame
because it failed to detect suspicious currency transactions even
with its high-tech banking system. 150
On May 4, 2002, the United Arab Emirates participated in a
regional financial conference with over 300 international dele-
gates and adopted the "Abu Dhabi Declaration on Hawala."15
System, Dec. 18, 2003, available at http://uaeinteract.com/news/default.asp?cntDisplay=
20&ID=140 (denying U.S. reports that U.A.E. banks were used to finance September
IIth terror attacks).
146. See Pasternak & Braun, supra note 100 (reporting that United Arab Emirates
had ties to Taliban before September 11th).
147. See Beckett, supra note 109 (reporting that U.A.E. exchange houses must get
government-issued identification from customers for any transaction over U.S.$550);
Middle East Review World of Information, supra note 73 (listing U.A.E. efforts to
tighten regulations of hawala); Olinger, supra note 100 (describing increased scrutiny
on United Arab Emirates).
148. See Raveendran, supra note 3 (describing contention with U.S. regulatory ef-
forts); O'Brien, supra note 141 (reporting that despite hawala registry, hawala brokers
are largely left to police themselves); Hardister, supra note 120, at 639-41 (noting that
United States cannot rely on other countries such as Saudi Arabia to act as fervently in
combating terrorism); Follow the Money, ECONOMIST, June 1, 2002 (arguing that even if
America's regime against terrorist financing were impregnable within its own borders,
terrorists could still take advantage of its links with countries that take laxer attitude).
149. See UAE Defends Hawala System, supra note 145 (describing resistance to Ameri-
can-led efforts). The U.A.E. Central Governor recently stated that, "the Hawala system
is internationally recognised and no one can dare to cast doubt over it. It is recognised
by 62 countries of the world including the G7 whose financial transactions control 80
per cent of the world financial order." Id. See also Raveendran, supra note 3 (reporting
on Suwaidi's defense of hawala networks); Hayaud-Din, supra note 93 (arguing that
Afghanis will not accept foreign regulatory model unless it operates in accordance with
Islamic principles).
150. See UAE Defends Hawala System, supra note 145 (blaming United States for not
detecting terrorist financing); Raveendran, supra note 3 (arguing that every money
laundering transaction interfaces with formal banking at some stage).
151. See Positive Aspects for Hawala Highlighted, May 5, 2002, available at http://
uaeinteract.com/news/default.asp?cntDisplay=10&ID=140 (describing results of con-
ference on hawala networks). The declaration came after two days of deliberations by
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This declaration recognized the "positive aspects" of hawala net-
works in that it "provides a fast and cost effective method for
worldwide remittance of money," and called for "effective but
not overly restrictive" regulation. 5 2 Furthermore, it noted that,
"the international community should continue to work individu-
ally and collectively to regulate the Hawala system for legitimate
commerce and to prevent its exploitation or misuse by criminals
and others."15 Relying on this declaration, the United Arab
Emirates formally institutionalized hawala networks in 2002.154
As part of the first steps, the United Arab Emirates issued li-
censes to fifty-five hawala brokers. 155
In one sense, this institutionalization of hawala in the
United Arab Emirates is no different than the regulation in the
United States, as both countries wish to make hawala transac-
tions more transparent. 156 The difference, however, lies in their
experts, bankers, law enforcement agencies and international regulators at the confer-
ence hosted by the U.A.E. Central Bank. Id. Over 300 delegates from the regional and
international financial community including representatives from Europe and the
United States attended the conference. Id.
152. See Abu Dhabi Declaration on Hawala, available at http://www.ustreas.gov/
offices/eotffc/programs/Hawala-conf.pdf(reprinting declaration). See also Follow the
Money, ECONOMIST, June 1, 2002 (reporting that American officials at conference said
that cheap efficiency of white hawala, makes it a "beautiful" system).
153. See id.
154. See UAE Central Bank Issues Certificates to Hawala Brokers, Sept. 9, 2003,
available at http://uaeinteract.com/news/default.asp?cntDisplay=10&ID=140 (describ-
ing new certificates issued to hawala brokers); /FT's Role in Financial System Discussed,
KHALEEJ TIMES, Apr. 6, 2004 (describing hawala as integral part of international finan-
cial system).
155. See Central Bank Issues 55 Licenses to Hawala Brokers, KHALEE TIMES, Sept. 14,
2003 (reporting that hawala brokers and intermediaries must provide details of money
transfers and report any dubious money transfers to Central Bank immediately); UAE
Defends Hawala System, supra note 145 (describing first steps in regulating hawala);
Muawia E. Ibrahim, UAE Money Laundering Law Selected by UNAs a Model, KHALEEJ TIMES,
Mar. 5, 2004 (reporting that United Nations selected U.A.E.'s regulations on hawala
money transmitting system as model for other countries). According to Michael A.
DeFeo, Terrorism Prevention Branch of the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, the
U.A.E.'s regulations observe principles of Islamic jurisprudence, something that a UN
model or European legislation could not have. Id.
156. See Abu Dhabi Declaration on Hawala (May 2002) (cited in Maimbo, supra
note 4, at 36 ann.5) (announcing that U.A.E. government imposes licensing require-
ment on hawalas). See also USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 § 359,
373 (2001) (expanding definition of "financial institution" to include underground
banking systems, such as hawala and requiring all "financial institutions" to maintain
anti-money laundering programs). See also President Announces Crackdown on Terrorist Fi-
nancial Network, supra note 123 (stating that G8 partners and others, including United
Arab Emirates have blocked assets and coordinated enforcement action).
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sentiments; namely, the United Arab Emirate's approach clashes
with that of mainstream U.S. law enforcement. 57 For instance,
the United Arab Emirates has openly voiced its support of and
recognizes the need for hawala networks. 158 It has even devel-
oped a national hawala-type system explicitly to enable its Somali
population to transfer money and other goods to Somalia." 9 In
contrast, the United States has sought to shut down hawala net-
works such as the Al Barakaat. 6 °
Regulating hawala networks is dependent on collaborative
157. See Ganguly, supra note 99 (describing hawala networks as "labyrinthine" of
shadiness); O'Brien, supra note 141 (citing elusive nature and daunting difficulties in
"penetrating the maze" of hawala networks). Cf Raveendran, supra note 3 (distinguish-
ing between hawala use for criminal intent and for justifiable purposes); Anne C. Rich-
ard, Europe Can Do More to Shut Down Terrorist Funds; the Money Trail, INT'L HERALD DAILY
TRIB., Mar. 19, 2004, at 6 (contrasting American "zero-tolerance approach" to regula-
tion with European approach).
158. See UAE Defends Hawala System, supra note 145 (defending legitimacy of
hawala operations); Beckett, supra note 109 (discussing prevalence of hawala networks
in Dubai and reluctance to take concrete action); Hawala Operators to be Licensed,
May 28, 2002, available at http://uaeinteract.com/news/default.asp?cntDisplay50&
ID=140 (reporting conference finding that hawala was widespread and permanent and
what was needed is regulation and supervision).
159. See Emirates Post Opens Window to Somalia, SOMALILAND TIMES, July 1, 2003 (re-
porting that Somalis in the United Arab Emirates will be able to transfer money legally).
This is the first international postal agreement for Somalia and the nearly 75,000
Somalis residing in the U.A.E. will not only be able to transfer money but will also be
able to send letters and parcels to Somalia. Id. See also Hayaud-Din, supra note 93
(describing Saudi Arabian government and banks working together to develop efficient
outlet for money transfers for large expatriate population); Noguchi, supra note 44
(offering suggestions on how to use hawala networks positively). The Asian Develop-
ment Bank found that one midway point between alternative remittance systems and
the long-term goal of establishing a more user-friendly formal banking sector is to de-
sign innovative, legal remittance methods that target certain groups. Id. A special sys-
tem could be used to deliver money for overseas workers in a specific country, for exam-
ple. Id. Once people have a competitive legal option to send money, and they begin to
move away from informal dealers, it will be easier for the authorities to track terrorists
and criminals who still use the older system. Id. See also JVTS Seen Emerging As Money
Transfer Solution, KHALEEJ TIMES, Apr. 5, 2004 (describing discussion at Second Interna-
tional Conference on Hawala in Abu Dhabi). Conference participants stressed the
huge economic contributions that migrant workers supplied. Id.
160. See Dam, supra note 1 (advocating increased efforts against hawala brokers
and other informal systems); Kaufman, supra note 88 (reporting on U.S. government
shutdown of A] Barakaat hawala network); How Two Dates Transformed Money Laundering
Field Worldwide, supra note 134 (reporting that U.S.' "extraterritorial jurisdiction" is co-
erced on other Nations); Gunaratna, supra note 133 (positing that "deep reservoir of
hatred and a desire for revenge" will remain unless United States thinks beyond
counter-terrorist military and financial dimensions). See also Stuart, supra note 75 (re-
porting that initiatives to capture benefits of remittances have been left to banks or
recipient communities themselves). Stuart notes that Citigroup, which owns Mexico's
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work with multiple countries and jurisdictions. 6' But, as the sit-
uation in the United Arab Emirates demonstrates, different Na-
tions do not necessarily agree on the best regulatory methods. 16 2
At the most basic level, Nations disagree as to the degree of con-
nection between hawala networks and terrorism.1 63  Further-
more, there are practical enforcement considerations, given that
most banks' staff in the United Arab Emirates are South Asian
largest bank, Banamex, has cut transmission costs to compete with unlicensed services.
Id.
161. See Cuellar, supra note 129, at 374-80 (describing international element of
money laundering crimes); Dam, supra note 1 (repeating sentiment that international
cooperation is important). Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Kenneth Dam stated,
"[I] nternational cooperation is particularly important because the financial front of the
war on terrorism cannot be won without it... you can't bomb a foreign bank account.
You need the cooperation of host government." Id. See also Meyer, supra note 126
(quoting Pakistan's Finance Minister Shaukat Aziz as saying, "the global effort so far was
too disjointed and anemic to have any chance of success").
162. See Josh Meyer & Eric Lichtblau, Crackdown on Terror Funding Is Questioned;
Finance: U.S. Officials Say a Lack of Evidence and Fighting Among Agencies Have Hampered the
Drive, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2002, at Al (describing different approaches to hawala regula-
tion). Nations such as Switzerland have asked for additional proof of wrongdoing by
suspected terrorists, charities, and other businesses before freezing assets. Id. See also
Richard, supra note 157 (criticizing American "zero-tolerance approach"); Still Flush,
ECONOMIST (reporting that blacklisting countries has failed); O'Brien, supra note 141
(describing lack of international cooperation). U.A.E. officials contend that foreign
counterparts rarely respond to their requests for detailed information to aid investiga-
tion when they do identify suspicious banking transactions. Id. Although the United
Arab Emirates filed 429 reports of suspicious transactions between August 2001 and
May 2003, and notified Canada, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Switzerland, the United
States, and the United Kingdom, these countries provided little aid. Id. See also Follow
the Money, ECONOMIST, June 1, 2002 (questioning American lists of terrorist financiers).
The Economist reports that the list contained misspelt Arabic names, missing basic identi-
fying details, such as place and date of birth, and some of the people included turned
out to be dead. Id. Switzerland and France stopped the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC, a guerrilla army) from going on the European Union's roster of
terrorist organizations, because that might hinder their efforts to help peace in the
country. Id. The list of organizations started out with 100 names, but whittled down to
ten after a number of countries had their say. Id.
163. See Wolosky, supra note 102 (testifying that standards of who and what consti-
tutes a terrorist have hindered progress). Wolosky testified that the European Union
still permits Hamas and Hezbollah to legally raise funds on its territory. Id. Other
States have been less willing to freeze funds over designated individuals and organiza-
tions originated by the U.S. government, and asked for increasingly sensitive intelli-
gence information that supported the original U.S. designations. Id. See also Razem,
supra note 136 (pointing out obstacles to regulations due to conflicting laws and differ-
ent interpretations of "terrorism" among different countries); Pasternak, supra note 100
(pointing out that tax evasion is not a crime in the U.A.E. because U.A.E. government
does not collect taxes).
2004] THE OBSTACLES TO REGULATING THE HAWALA 2041
immigrant workers on tenuous contracts,' 6 4 who might not nec-
essarily want to press the wealthy locals for documentation. 165 It
is unclear what action the United States will take if countries re-
fuse to take the steps that it demands.'6 6
C. Specific Hawala Cases
As mentioned above, both the United States and the United
Arab Emirates have increased efforts to license hawala networks
after September llth. 6 7 The U.S. government sought to regu-
late hawala networks through the shutdown of the Al Barakaat
hawala, and the prosecution of Hussein Ashafei and Mohammed
Albanna. 1
68
164. See Beckett, supra note 109 (discussing popularity and demand of hawala
among U.A.E's two million foreign laborers and arguing that any clampdown on ex-
isting hawala brokers would simply cause others to spring up in their place); Jost &
Sandhu, supra note 4 (stating that South Asian laborers make up about half U.A.E.'s
population); Raveendran, supra note 3 (reporting on large number of expatriate work-
ers and businessmen in Dubai).
165. See Razem, supra note 136 (stating that most pressing issue against terrorist
financing is cooperation among countries and among financial institutions at verifica-
tion and investigation stages); Beckett, supra note 109 (quoting Sultan bin Nasser Al
Suweidi, as, "you could say the banks are not really keen to have in their halls these dirty
laborers whose shoes are full of dust"); Report to the Congress, supra note 47, at 17 (warn-
ing that cooperation of hawala brokers is essential in translating records, and such co-
operation might not be forthcoming if ethnic, cultural or other sensitivities are misun-
derstood or ignored by law enforcement); The Financial Front Line, ECONOMIST, Oct. 27,
2001 (describing obstacles in regulating hawala).
166. See Phillips & Johnson, supra note 124 (reporting that Germany and France
have each ordered banks to block accounts of just 140 of 192 people and entities on
U.S.' alleged terrorist financiers list). Some other European countries have focused
chiefly on local problems. Id. Spain has added twenty-one names, all alleged extremists
from its restive Basque region and Britain has contributed six, all allegedly involved in
violence in Northern Ireland. Id. See also Cottle, supra note 78 (arguing that U.S. law
enforcement has failed to engage in diplomacy); Still Hush, supra note 162 (reporting
that blacklisting countries might hurt more than it helps); Meyer, supra note 126
(describing that European countries do not necessarily believe U.S. assertions linking
hawala to terrorism).
167. See Meyer, supra note 126 (reporting Operation Green Quest efforts); Fact
Sheet, supra note 127 (stating U.S. dollar amounts that Operation Green Quest had
frozen); Phillips, supra note 105 (reporting increased hawala registration after Septem-
ber llth); See Abu Dhabi Declaration on Hawala, supra note 152 (describing new
hawala regulations in United Arab Emirates).
168. See Kaufman, supra note 88 (reporting shutdown of Al Barakaat network);
Davila & Rivera, supra note 108 (describing prosecution of Hussein Alshafei); Eggen,
supra note 108 (describing prosecution of Mohammed Albanna).
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1. Al Barakaat Hawala
Al Barakaat was a Somalia-based organization with outlets in
Europe and North America through which Somalia's diaspora
sent cash to their families. 69 While the company began as a
money transfer operation (hawala), Al Barakaat grew into a ma-
jor telecommunications and construction enterprise that even
generated electric power and provided internet connection in
Somalia.17 ' Al Barakaat employed 1,300 people, making it the
largest employer in one of the poorest countries worldwide. 171
Because Somalia's banking system is weak, Somali emigrants
heavily rely on hawala networks to send money to their rela-
tives. 172 A U.N. report estimates that the Somali diaspora sent
up to U.S.$1 billion to Somalia and neighboring regions each
year, making the money sent from relatives abroad Somalia's
largest single source of income. 73
169. See Tim Golden et al., 5 Months After Against Somali Company, Scant Proof of
Qaeda Tie, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2002, at A10 (discussing broad scope of Al Barakaat
operations); Mark Turner, Barakat Pleads Innocent to US 'Terror' Claim: Remittance Com-
pany Washington 's Accusations Against the Somalian Operation Have Led to Its Effective Clo-
sure, FIN. TIMES (London) Nov. 12, 2001, at 6 (describing importance of Al Barakaat).
Remittances from Somali diaspora dwarf foreign aid and livestock exports, as well as the
budget of Somalia's fledgling transitional government. Id.
170. See Kaufman, supra note 88 (describing importance of hawala networks to
diaspora communities); Edward Alden & Mark Turner, Assets Frozen As US Targets Al-
Qaeda Financing, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 7, 2001, at 1 (describing growth of Al
Barakaat network to include mobile phones).
171. See Kaufman, supra note 88 (reporting that money sent from relatives abroad
is Somalia's largest single source of income, and has been cut by more than half); Sam-
son Mulugeta, Somali Lifeline Now U.S. Target; Money-Transfer Firm Says It's Innocent, NEws-
DAY, Nov. 25, 2001, at A2; Martin Merzer, Raids Target Terrorist Assets; Businesses in Five
States Handled Millions, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL, Nov. 8, 2001, at Al (describing
worldwide scope of Al Barakaat).
172. See Leslie, supra note 79 (discussing reliance on hawala networks); Mulugeta,
supra note 171 (discussing Al Barakaat as Somalia's financial lifeline after government
collapsed in 1991); Ted Wendling, Lifeline for Some Is Linked To Terror; Money Transfers
That Aid Somalis Also Tied to Al-Qaida, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Dec. 3, 2001, at All
(describing Somali refugees' reliance on hawala networks in Columbus, Ohio). One
community member sends U.S.$500 each month to Somalia to support fifty-five rela-
tives. Id. Another said he was shocked to learn that the U.S. government believed that
Somali refugees, having fled their war-ravaged homeland, would come to the United
States and begin supporting terrorists. Id.
173. See Leslie, supra note 79 (reporting that Somalis from Minnesota wired about
U.S.$7 million each month in 2000); Mulugeta, supra note 171 (stating Al Barakaat
controlled 60% of U.S.$650 million in annual remittances by Somalis living abroad);
Chris Tomlinson, Somali Banker Accused of Being Al-Qaida Money Man in Legal Limbo
Two Years Later, THE STATE (Columbia, SC), Oct. 27, 2003 (reporting that Al Barakaat
handled U.S.$12 million in money transfers each year).
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After September 11th, the U.S. government identified Al
Barakaat as a major financial operation that supported terrorist
organizations.' 7 4  According to the U.S. government, Al
Barakaat's worldwide network channeled as much as U.S.$15 to
U.S.$20 million to Al Qaeda each year. "75 The United States al-
leged that Al Barakaat was founded by Osama bin Laden associ-
ate Ahmed Nur AliJim'ale, who became close to bin Laden dur-
ing the Afghan war against the Soviet Union. 7 6 On November
7, 2001, less than two months after the September 11th attacks,
U.S. federal agents raided storefront businesses in four states.177
As part of that action, the U.S. government included Al Barakaat
on a list of organizations accused of funneling money to ter-
rorists, and seized U.S.$1.9 million in assets. 17 8
As a result of the Al Barakaat shutdown, the United States
disrupted what was potentially a major flow of funds to terrorist
groups. 179 By freezing the assets they were able to deny potential
174. See Dam, supra note 1 (hailing shutdown of Al Barakaat as successful). Presi-
dent Bush announced sanctions against the Al Barakaat company on November 7, 2001
and stated that it, "raised funds for Al Qaeda. They manage, invest and distribute those
funds. They provide terrorist supporters with Internet service.... They even arrange
for the shipment of weapons." Id. See also Golden, supra note 169 (discussing U.S.
government's allegations against Al Barakaat); Merzer, supra note 171 (stating U.S. gov-
ernment's rationale for shutting down Al Barakaat); Edward Alden & Mark Huband,
Case Still Open on 'Terror's Quartermasters' But the US Remains Convinced That Barakat, the
Somali Money-Transfer Group, Funds Al-Qaeda, FIN. TIMES (London) Feb. 21, 2002 (report-
ing that Paul O'Neill called Al Barakaat "the quartermasters of terror" and "a pariah in
the civilised world").
175. See Dam, supra note I (noting that U.S. government disrupted U.S.$300-400
million in annual flows through hawala networks); Phillips, supra note 105 (reporting
that Bush administration has named Al Barakaat a "terrorist-related financial entity");
Golden, supra note 169 (reporting on Al Barakaat shutdown).
176. See Fact Sheet, supra note 127 (statingJimale's links to bin Laden). The White
House alleged that Al Barakaat raises, manages, invests, and distributes funds for Al
Qaeda. Id. See also Golden, supra note 169 (reporting that Al Barakaat's founder, Ah-
med Nur Ali Jumale befriended Osama bin Laden). Golden also reports that Mr.
Jumale claims he has never met bin Laden. Id. See also Merzer, supra note 171 (report-
ing links between Al Barakaat and Al Qaeda); Tomlinson, supra note 173 (reporting
that Ahmed Nur AliJim'ale has been deported to Somalia and two years after Septem-
ber 1 I th, approximately U.S.$8.5 million remains frozen).
177. See President Announces Crackdown on Terrorist Financial Network, supra note 123
(describing U.S. Treasury Department's blocking of assets of sixty-two individuals and
organizations connected with Al Barakaat and Al Taqua organizations).
178. See Dam, supra note I (describing financial success of Al Barakaat shutdown);
Fact Sheet, supra note 127 (reporting on freezing efforts).
179. See Dam, supra note I (describing freezing of funds in Al Barakaat shutdown);
Phillips, supra note 105 (reporting that U.S. government says it cut off as much as
U.S.$20 million in annual funding for al Qaeda network after shutdown).
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terrorists opportunities to travel, communicate, procure equip-
ment, and conduct attacks."' 0 Additionally, they were able to
punish non-terrorists, who had conducted illegal money trans-
fers, evaded tax payments, or had structured transactions.
181
The shutdown also encouraged many hawala brokers to register
or license their operations. 1
82
On the other hand, critics have maintained that the com-
plete shutdown of Al Barakaat needlessly disrupted a major
source of income for many innocent people. 8 Thousands who
invested in branches of Al Barakaat had their money seized in-
definitely, as did those who simply put their savings in Al
Barakaat banks.184 Many countries and organizations, including
the United Nations, have been critical of this shutdown."8 5
180. See Matthew Levitt, Iraq, U.S., and the War on Terror: Stemming the Flow of Terror-
ist Financing: Practical and Conceptual Challenges, 27 FLETCHER F. WORLD Alt. 59, 61
(2003) (discussing positive outcome of freezing funds); Bantekas, supra note 99
(describing freezing efforts of U.S. government).
181. SeeJackman, supra note 36 (describing penalties for two men who structured
transactions to United Arab Emirates); David Marshall Nissman, Hawala, U.S. ATroR-
NEvS' BULL., May 2002, at 18-20 (describing one indictment for failing to fill out cur-
rency transaction report and structuring); Merzer, supra note 171 (describing other
arrests); Somali Man Convicted In Money Transfer, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2002, at A22
(describing first successful prosecution after USA PATRIOT Act in Boston). Mohamed
Hussein was found guilty of two counts of transmitting U.S.$2.8 million abroad without
a license and is subject to two to three years in prison. Id. There were no terrorism
charges filed. Id.
182. See Nat'l Money Laundering Strategy 2003, supra note 52, at 14 (documenting
registrations of over 14,000 money service businesses since September 11 th); Howell,
supra note 128 (discussing increased number of money transmitting services that have
now registered).
183. See Phillips, supra note 105 (reporting that crackdown disrupted U.S.$15 mil-
lion to U.S.$20 million destined for al Qaeda as well as U.S.$300 million to U.S.$400
million in annual flows); Mulugeta, supra note 171 (describing need for hawala because
of anarchy conditions in Somalia). Mulugeta quotes one critic, "It's like trying to kill a
fly with a sledgehammer. This is U.S.$600 million a year in remittances, and you cut
that off, and Somalia dies." Id. See also Richard, supra note 157 (criticizing American
"zero-tolerance approach" to hawala regulation); UAE Urg-s World to Isolate Hawala Sys-
tem Abusers, May 16, 2002, available at http://uaeinteract.com/news/default.asp?cntDis-
play-50&ID=140 (arguing that prohibition of hawala networks will be unsuccessful).
184. See Olinger, supra note 100 (describing disruptive effect of shutdown); Mark
Turner, Barakat Telecoms Gateway Cut Off, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 16, 2001, at 15
(describing suspension of its international telecommunications services after Concert
Communications cut off its international gateway); Kaufman, supra note 88 (describing
impact of shutdown for Somalians); Hardister, supra note 120 (arguing for alternative
measures that would be equally effective in combating financial support for terrorism
without infringing on sovereignty of foreign banks).
185. See Kaufman, supra note 88 (describing effects of shutdown). Kaufman
quotes a U.N. humanitarian representative in Somalia as stating, "The A] Barakaat clo-
2004] THE OBSTACLES TO REGULATING THE HAWALA 2045
Critics also point out that the evidence linking Al Barakaat
to terrorism is more tenuous than at first suspected. 86 Despite
freezing millions of U.S. dollars, there have been only four re-
lated criminal prosecutions, none of which involve charges in-
volving terrorist activity. 87 U.S. investigators have been sifting
through voluminous documents, many of them small remit-
tances from Somali refugees to their relatives.188 There have
even been cases in which the U.S. government has erroneously
frozen assets.1 8 9
sure is having a very, very serious effect. We are at a point where we have to start
anticipating a crisis that could be unique in the modem state system - collapse of an
entire national economy." Id. See also Olinger, supra note 100 (quoting several critics
of hawala prosecutions). The chief executive at the Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank
stated, "When they closed this bank, they closed the service of a Nation. It would be
like, in the United States, closing AT&T and Citibank and Microsoft." Id. Another
critic stated, "They've cast a wide net, and they aren't providing a way to correct any
errors they might have made." Id. See also William Hall et al., Cash Movers Branded As
Financiers of Terrorism, FIN. TIMES (London) Nov. 8, 2001 at 10 (citing Al Barakaat's vice
president as dismayed at reports linking it to terrorism, which it says are unfounded
rumors spread by political enemies); Follow the money, ECONOMIST, June 1, 2002 (report-
ing that Swedish government froze assets as result of Al Barakaat shutdown, but now
believes that men are innocent).
186. See Golden, supra note 169 (reporting that link between Al Barakaat and Al
Qaeda was overstated); Turner, supra note 169 (denying that Mogadishu office of
Barakaat International has any terrorist links). Somali hawala brokers Barakaat Interna-
tional demonstrated computer records of their transfers and deny links to Osama bin
Laden or Al Qaeda. Id. See also Report to the Congress, supra note 47 (citing challenges to
law enforcement given that most U.S.-based informal value transfer systems are legiti-
mate and enable U.S. residents to send money to relatives in other countries that nor-
mally do not have advanced financial infrastructures).
187. See Terrorist Financing, supra note 2, at 24 n.44 (noting that U.S. government
had only frozen U.S.$719,832 in total Al Qaeda assets as ofJuly 31, 2003); Golden, supra
note 169 (discussing questionable prosecutions); Yousef, supra note 80 (presuming that
most individuals utilizing hawala networks in United States are conducting legitimate
activities); Tomlinson, supra note 173 (reporting that neither Jim'ale nor any of his
employees have been charged with terror-related crimes). At least two Al Barakaat em-
ployees in Alexandria, Virginia and one in Boston were convicted of violating mi-
nor state banking regulations, while employees in Minnesota and Ohio were re-
leased without charge. Id. Two employees in Sweden and one in Canada were taken
off the Treasury Department terrorist financier list after their governments pro-
tested there was no evidence against them. Id.
188. See Golden, supra note 169 (reporting skepticism at Al Barakaat shutdown
efforts); Olinger, supra note 100 (reporting doubt about links to Al Qaeda); Tomlinson,
supra note 173 (questioning Al Barakaat shutdown given that September 11 th hijackers
used formal banks rather than hawala networks for their financial transactions).
189. See Kavita Kumar, Lifting of Sanctions Brings Relief- the Somali-Born Owners of Two
Money-Wiring Firms Have Their Names Cleared, STAR TRm., Aug. 28, 2002 (reporting two
cases of governmental error). In one case, the U.S. government seized U.S.$500,000
from Garad Nor, a Minneapolis resident, who had a money-wiring business called
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Finally, it is noteworthy that although U.S. authorities al-
leged that the Al Barakaat shutdown deprived the Al Qaeda ter-
rorist network of a vital financial conduit, the network is still
alive in some European cities, and new networks have reportedly
taken its place.19 ° One theory as to why such organizations can-
not be effectively shut down is that decentralized, small-scale op-
erations moved relatively small sums of cash.' 9 ' The resilience of
this hawala network calls into question one of the biggest suc-
cesses the United States has claimed in the offensive against ter-
rorism. 9
2
2. Hussein Alshafei, Iraqi-American, Based in Seattle
Uses Hawala
In another Operation Green Quest effort, customs officials
arrested an Iraqi-American, Hussein Alshafei, in January 2002
for violation of the embargo, alleging that he transferred more
than U.S.$12 million to Iraq and other countries in the Middle
East over two and a half years. 93 For a 4-6% fee, Iraqi-Americans
deposited money into his business called Alshafei Family Con-
nect, and through agents in Jordan, Alshafei transferred the
money to the intended recipients in Iraq.194 Prosecutors ac-
knowledged that Alshafei's hawala had no terrorist connections,
and that the vast majority of Alshafei's customers were motivated
by their concerns for the welfare of relatives in Iraq.1 95
Aaran Money Wire Service Inc. Id. He was never charged and was without his money
for close to nine months. Id. He filed a lawsuit, and after nine months the U.S. govern-
ment acknowledged there was no link to terrorism, and unfroze the money. Id. See also
Nimer, supra note 127 (describing that Minneapolis-based Al Barakaat was cleared of
terrorism connections in August 2002).
190. See Cooper & Johnson, supra note 36 (reporting that Al Barakaat employees
are still offering their services in Bonn, Frankfurt, Munich, Holland, and Sweden); Tur-
ner, supra note 169 (reporting that Dahabshiil company, Al Barakaat's main competitor
provides more remittance services); Wendling, supra note 172, at Al 1 (describing in-
creased business for Dahabshiil Inc. hawala after Al Barakaat shutdown).
191. See Cooper & Johnson, supra note 36 (pointing out that although money-
laundering investigators generally rely on financial institutions to report large transfers
of money, most hawala users move about U.S.$200 a week); Stuart, supra note 75 (not-
ing U.N. intervention to ensure that no other money transfer company is forcibly shut).
192. See Cooper & Johnson, supra note 36 (describing resilience of Al Barakaat
network).
193. See Davila & Rivera, supra note 108 (describing charges against Alshafei).
194. See id. (describing logistics of hawala). See generally Jost & Sandhu, supra note
4 (explaining how hawala networks operate).
195. See Michael Ko, Iraqi American Gets 8-Month Term, SEATrLE TIMES, Sept. 12,
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One noteworthy feature in this case is Alshafei's purpose in
operating the hawala.'96 Shortly after Saddam Hussein took
power in 1979, Hussein executed Alshafei's father and uncle. 19
7
Alshafei was a Shiite Muslim that participated in the 1991 upris-
ing against Hussein, and fled Iraq shortly after the 1991 Gulf
War. 9" Because U.S. sanctions made it difficult to conduct legal
financial transactions in Iraq, Alshafei started his hawala ser-
vice.199 He believed that he was conducting a humanitarian ser-
vice because he was able to provide food, medicine and health
care to Iraqis.20° Eventually, Alshafei pled guilty to one count of
money laundering and admitted that he had lied on his federal
income-tax returns, and was sentenced to eight months in prison
and fined U.S.$5,000. 211 In determining his sentence, the court
recognized his background and life as an Iraqi expatriate.2 °2
There has been an outpouring of community support for
Alshafei2 ° Critics have argued that he was justified in operating
2003, at B2 (describing Alshafei's motivation for hawala). See also Ray Rivera, Judge Sets
Bail for Man Accused of Aiding Iraq; Suspect Says Saddam Slew His Father, Uncle Years Ago,
SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 25, 2002, at BI (indicating that prosecutors were investigating
whether cash was used to support terrorism or Sadaam Hussein regime).
196. See Todd Bensman, Motive In Transfers Debated; Authorities See a Threat; Iraqis in
U.S. Say Funds Keep Kin Alive at Home, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 21, 2003, at 15A
(describing repressive regime for Shiites). One Iraqi opposition group based in Wash-
ington, D.C., said the flow of U.S. dollars has eased the regime's leverage over the Shiite
population, allowing them to resist constant repression. He said without the money,
families are forced to rely on government food ration cards and salaries that can be
revoked for disobedience, such as refusing to inform on neighbors. Id.
197. See Davila & Rivera, supra note 108 (providing background on Alshafei's life);
Rivera, supra note 168 (describing Alshafei's motive in setting up hawala business).
198. See Davila & Rivera, supra note 108 (describing Alshafei's execution of his
father and uncle by Saddam Hussein); Rivera, supra note 195 (reporting that Saddam
Hussein executed Alshafei's family).
199. See Rivera, supra note 195 (describing Alshafei's motive in starting hawala net-
works); Hegstrom, supra note 87 (describing Iranian Americans' reliance on hawala
networks).
200. See Davila & Rivera, supra note 108 (reporting that Alshafei's motives were
primarily humanitarian). Cf Ray Rivera, Edmonds Man Pleads Guilty to 1 Money-Launder-
ing Charge: No Terrorist Ties Found, All Other Charges Dropped Against Iraqi American, SEAT-
TLE TIMES, June 13, 2003, at BI (reporting that Alshafei acknowledged profit as an addi-
tional motive for operating hawala).
201. See Ko, supra note 195 (reporting outcome of case).
202. See id. (describing effect of revoked 1990 law banning financial dealings with
Iraq in Alshafei's sentencing); Rivera, supra note 195 (describing judge's sympathy in
sentencing Alshafei).
203. See Davila & Rivera, supra note 108 (quoting several community members in
support of hawala networks). One local stated, "This guy, he did a great job. He
helped all of us by transferring money." Id. Another critic posited, "It's a case of selec-
2048 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 27:2007
his hawala service because of perceived unfair sanctions.2 °4
Others have argued that the Alshafei case represents selective
enforcement of U.S. sanctions laws because many large corpora-
tions have received civil penalties instead of criminal penalties
for violating sanctions or trade embargoes.2 °5 For example,
Ikea, the Swedish home furnishings company, paid U.S.$8,000
for importing about U.S.$14,000 worth of rugs from an area of
Afghanistan controlled by the Taliban, and Tyson Foods paid
U.S.$150,000 for shipping chicken to Iraq.2 °6
3. Mohammad Albanna, Yemeni-American, Based in
Lackawanna Uses Hawala
Operation Green Quest agents also arrested Mohammed Al-
banna in Lackawanna, New York on December 17, 2002 for run-
ning an unlicensed hawala. 2°7 Albanna was charged with using a
hawala to illegally transfer U.S.$3.5 million to Yemen between
November 2001 and December 2002.208 He allegedly failed to
tive prosecution is what it is." Id. See also Bensman, supra note 196 (describing clashing
views between federal authorities who allege'hawala brokers pose a threat to the United
States and Iraqi immigrants who say hawala brokers provide humanitarian service).
204. See Olinger, supra note 100 (reporting United Arab Emirates as criticizing
sanctions as "economic terrorism").
205. See Peter Shinkle, Ex-Refugee from Iraq Keeps Faith in Freedom after Arrest, ST.
Louis POST-DISPATCH, July 8, 2003 (describing charges dropped for Al Barakaat co-de-
fendants from Dallas, Nashville, Phoenix, Roanoke, St. Louis). See also Davila & Rivera,
supra note 108 (discussing disparate treatment argument). Since 1999, the U.S. govern-
ment has collected approximately U.S.$900,000 from companies to settle allegations of
violating sanctions by doing business in Iraq. Id.
206. See Davila & Rivera, supra note 108 (reporting that settlements have ranged
from U.S.$9,000, collected from ChevronTexaco to as much as U.S.$244,250 from GRE
Insurance Group and Albany Insurance Group); Anitha Reddy, Ikea, Tyson Foods Among
U.S. Embargo Violators, WASH. PosT,July 3, 2002, at El (reporting various companies and
banks' settlements for violating U.S. trade embargoes); U.S. Companies Pay Penalties for
Trade with Certain Nations, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2002, at A9 (describing American compa-
nies cash settlements for violating sanctions on trade and investment in parts of Afghan-
istan under Taliban control and Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea). The com-
panies include Boeing, General Electric, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley Dean Witter,
Citigroup, and First Union. Id. Johnson & Johnson Medical Middle East paid
U.S.$110,000 for shipping about U.S.$7 million of medical equipment to Iraq. Id. The
GRE Insurance Group, Albany Insurance Company paid nearly U.S.$250,000 in Febru-
ary 1999 for providing insurance coverage for shipments to the government of Iraq and
to a company in Libya. Id.
207. See Eggen, supra note 108 (reporting charges against Albanna); Marc Santora,
The Buffalo Case; A Civic Leader Is Charged in Money Transfers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2002, at
A16 (providing background on Albanna case).
208. See Dan Herbeck, Albanna Arraigned for Mailing Cash to Yemen, BUFFALO NEWS,
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file the required paperwork in transmitting sums of more than
U.S.$10,000. 20 9 Furthermore, he was not registered in the state
of New York or with the U.S. Treasury Department, as the USA
PATRIOT Act requires.21 0 His alleged crime is punishable by up
to ten years in prison.211
Albanna has been a U.S. citizen for twenty-seven years, a res-
ident of the Buffalo area since 1970, and has not left the United
States for twenty years.2 1 2 Notably, Albanna is the uncle ofJaber
Elbaneh, who was an unindicted co-conspirator in the Lack-
awanna Six case, and publicly supported them before their con-
victions.213 Prosecutors concede that none of the money Al-
banna sent to Yemen was used to fund terrorism.21 4
Albanna's status and ties to the community2 15 have engen-
dered vocal support and sharp criticism against the U.S. govern-
ment. 216 His supporters say that he was merely following the
traditional Yemeni practice of sending money back home, some-
thing that has been quietly tolerated by the government for de-
cades. 21 7 Civil liberties groups have weighed in on such guilt-by-
Jan. 13, 2004, at B3 (reporting that Albanna was originally charged with sending
U.S.$486,548 to Yemen).
209. See The Lackawanna-Yemen Money Trail; Albanna Deserves Presumption of Inno-
cence, But U.S. Has a Duty to Investigate, BUFFALO NEWS, Dec. 19, 2002, at B10 [hereinafter
Lackawanna-Yemen Money Trail] (describing Albanna's alleged failure to complete cur-
rency transaction reports).
210. See Beebe & Tan, supra note 8 (noting that no hawala businesses are regis-
tered in New York state); Nat'l Money Laundering Strategy 2003, supra note 52, at 14
(noting increased number of money transmitter businesses that have registered with
federal government after September l1th).
211. See Herbeck, supra note 208 (describing potential penalty).
212. See Santora supra note 207 (providing background on Albanna); Eggen, supra
108 (describing Albanna's background).
213. See Eggen, supra note 108 (reporting that Albanna had been vocally support-
ive in proclaiming the innocence of the Lackawanna Six, who were all eventually con-
victed of attending an A] Qaeda camp in Kandahar).
214. See id. (reporting on lack of terrorist connections); Herbeck, supra note 208
(stating lack of terrorist links in Albanna's prosecution).
215. See Herbeck, supra note 208 (describing Albanna's community prominence as
president of Lackawanna Yemenite Benevolent Association); Lackawanna-Yemen Money
Trail, supra note 209 (noting his respected status).
216. See David Shepardson, Fed Raids Target Money to Yemen; 6 Arrested; Millions of
Dollars Illegally Sent, DETROIT NEWS, Dec. 19, 2002, at IA (discussing community outrage
in Detroit). One Yemeni immigrant decried, "What is the connection of Yemeni immi-
grants working at Ford Motor Co., the Rouge plant, to Al-Qaida? This [is] the govern-
ment's scorched-earth policy to harass people in abject poverty who are trying to send a
few dollars home to their families." Id.
217. See Herbeck, supra note 208 (describing community sentiment). Albanna in-
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association prosecutions reminiscent of the racial profiling of
other unpopular groups in times of war.218 Similar charges were
brought against Yemeni-Americans in Detroit, but they were
dropped one year later.219 Most recently, one Denver-based fed-
eral judge struck down the USA PATRIOT Act provision that
deals with unlicensed money transfer systems as unconstitu-
tional. 220 The case against Albanna is presently pending.
22 1
sists he had no criminal intent stating, "People who come to America like to send
money back to their families in Yemen. It's a tradition. We helped them. This service
is needed by families in Yemen . . We aren't providing it anymore, and people are
suffering." Id. See also Lackawanna-Yemen Money Trail, supra note 209 (arguing that
there is no evidence that Albanna did anything other than help his fellow Yemeni-
Americans send money to relatives); Howell, supra note 128 (describing conviction of
Brooklyn-based Yemeni immigrant, Ali Kassim Kassim for conducting an unlicensed
money transmitting business). Howell reports that many in the Yemeni community are
afraid now to operate or use hawala networks. Id. He quotes Yemeni American as
saying, "Now there's nobody taking the job [of hawaladar], nobody saying I'm going to
do it for these poor people, so people are hurting." Id. Many Yemeni Americans are
waiting to give their remittances to a relative or friend traveling to Yemen because in
some cases, they do not have proper documentation and are afraid of immigration
officials. Id.
218. See Nancy Chang, Alan Kabat, A Summary of Recent Court Rulings on Terrorism-
Related Matters Having Civil Liberties Implications, Center for Constitutional Rights, Sept.
11, 2003, at 12-15, available at http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/legal/septemberI 1 th/docs/
9-11CaseListv9j 103.pdf (discussing various post-September 11th prosecutions with
civil liberties implications); Eric Lichtblau, Threats and Responses: American Muslims;
F.B.I Tells Officers to Count Local Muslims and Mosques, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2003, at A13
(reporting that F.B.I. ordered field supervisors to count mosques and Muslims in their
areas as part of antiterrorism effort); John Mintz & Douglas Farah, Small Scams Probed for
Terror Ties; Muslim, Arab Stores Monitored As Part of Post-Sep. 11 Inquiry, WASH. POST, Aug.
12, 2002, at Al (reporting investigation of 500 Muslim and Arab small businesses across
United States); Nimer, supra note 127, at 16-25 (giving examples of anti-Muslim rheto-
ric, hate crimes, racial profiling, detentions after September 1 th). See also Korematsu
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (describing internment during World War II of
more than 120,000Japanese-Americans, including 70,000 American citizens). Haroon
Siddiqui, Treading an Ugly Path on Security, TORONTO STAR, Oct. 16, 2003, at A31 (warn-
ing against collective punishment and selective prosecutions).
219. See David Shepardson, Feds Drop Charges Against Yemenis; They Were Accused of
Illegally Sending $50 million to Homeland. U.S. Could Refile Later, DETROIT NEWS, Jan. 8,
2003, at 1C (describing dismissal of charges). It reports the dismissal as "basically an-
other fumble by the government. This is part of a post-9-1 1 paranoia on the part of the
government." Id. See also Herbeck, supra note 208 (reporting that federal agents
wiretapped more than 1,100 phone conversations and hired two Arabic interpreters to
translate Albanna's calls).
220. See Karen Abbott, Judge Strikes Down Money-Transfer Law; Licenses Found Uncon-
stitutional in Aurora Man's Case, Rociv MOUNTAIN NEWS (Denver), Apr. 9, 2004, at 15B
(reporting about constitutional challenge to PATRIOT Act provision). U.S. District
Judge, Lewis Babcock, stated that the law arbitrarily divided money-transfer operators
into two groups - those covered by state laws and those who work in states that do not
require a license. Id.
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III: THE OBSTACLES TO REGULATING THE HAWALA: A
CULTURAL NORM OR A TERRORIST HOTBED?
The events of September 11, 2001 paved the way for stricter
regulation of financial institutions through the new USA PA-
TRIOT Act provisions and Operation Green Quest raids.22 2 Law
enforcement officials consider regulating hawala networks nec-
essary because its unregulated nature, in particular, makes it an
appealing option for money launderers, smugglers, and even ter-
rorists. 2 2 ' Licensing and regulating hawala networks also help
bring more money into State economies.224 At present, it is im-
possible to accurately gauge the magnitude of hawala use world-
wide, but it is fair to state that hawala transactions run in the
billions.2 2 5 While the above cases are not necessarily representa-
tive of all of Operation Green Quest's efforts, they do raise sev-
eral issues for consideration.
A. Socioeconomic-cultural Defense
All three of the cases mentioned above prompted commu-
nity outrage over the persecution of hawala networks. 226 In the
Albanna case, many in the Yemeni-American community ex-
pressed their belief that Albanna had engaged in humanitarian
work rather than criminal activity. 227 In the Alshafei case, many
community members believed that Alshafei was providing a pub-
lic service to counteract the limits imposed by perceived unfair
sanctions. 22' The Al Barakaat hawala shutdown had the largest
221. See United States v. Mohammed Albanna, Ali A. Albanna, and Ali Taher
Elbaneh, No. 02-CR-255 (W.D.N.Y.); see also FBI Press Release, at http://buffalo.fbi.
gov/pressrel/2004/alb010804.htm (last visited June 24, 2004) (noting federal indict-
ment of Albanna).
222. See supra notes 111-21, 123-29 and accompanying text (describing USA PA-
TRIOT Act provisions and Operation Green Quest raids and freezing of assets).
223. See supra notes 97-106 (describing appeal of hawala networks for criminals).
224. See supra notes 72-92 (emphasizing economic costs of unregulated money
transfer systems).
225. See supra notes 75-78 (estimating that annual remittances may be more than
U.S.$100 billion).
226. See supra notes 183-92, 203-06, 215-21 and accompanying text (describing in-
dividual reactions to hawala crackdown).
227. See supra notes 215-19 and accompanying text (describing community support
for Albanna).
228. See supra notes 203-06 and accompanying text (describing sentiment that
hawala use was justified in response to sanctions).
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effect, freezing the assets of thousands of innocent people. 2
29
To these community members, failing to register or license a
hawala business hardly appeared to be criminal conduct.230
Hawala networks serve an essential function and many re-
cent immigrants and refugees choose hawala networks over for-
mal banking systems because they are less expensive, more effi-
cient, broader in reach, and free of extensive paperwork. 231
From the perspective of many immigrants, hawala networks are a
longstanding cultural norm rather than a criminal offense.23 2
Indeed, there is a greater likelihood that the U.S. govern-
ment will be able to interrupt terrorist financing, money laun-
dering and other criminal activity by shutting down hawala net-
works.233 Prosecutions of unlicensed hawala businesses send a
clear message that such activity is unacceptable, and this in-
creased awareness could result in diminished use of these unli-
censed networks. 214 On the other hand, the rash response that
spurred law enforcement to completely shut down Al Barakaat
was disproportionate to the threat it posed.235 As yet, there have
been no terrorism-related hawala prosecutions as a result of the
shutdown.23 6 It would have been more effective and less disrup-
tive if the United States had examined the accounts, investigated
the owners, and sent intelligence units to the United Arab Emir-
ates to find those with potential terrorist connections. 2 37 In that
way, the United States might have wreaked less havoc in the lives
229. See supra notes 183-92 and accompanying text (describing widespread disrup-
tion caused by Al Barakaat shutdown).
230. See supra notes 183-92, 203-06, 215-22 and accompanying text (reporting com-
munity views on hawala prosecutions).
231. See supra notes 42-49, 61-63 and accompanying text (discussing multiple ad-
vantages of hawala including efficiency and lack of paper trail).
232. See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text (describing cultural and relig-
ious reasons for hawala use).
233. See supra notes 174-82 and accompanying text (discussing success of Al
Barakaat shutdown).
234. See supra note 130 and accompanying text (discussing increased number of
money services that have registered after September 11th).
235. See supra notes 183-91 and accompanying text (describing criticism of Al
Barakaat hawala shutdown).
236. See supra notes 186-91 and accompanying text (describing most individuals
using hawala as conducting non-terrorist activities).
237. See supra notes 135-39 and accompanying text (urging for better training and
enforcement).
2004] THE OBSTACLES TO REGULATING THE HAWALA 2053
of ordinary people. 218
It is highly unlikely that individuals will stop using hawala
networks to send money to their home countries. 239 The Alshafei
case in particular, reflects the reality that people will find ways to
send money despite sanctions.2 4 ° Ultimately, the only way to
compete with hawala businesses is to reduce the economic in-
centives to use them.2 4 1
B. Selective Law Enforcement
All three of the above-mentioned cases, while not necessa-
rily representative, involve Muslim Americans, and demonstrate
the anti-Islamic guilt-by-association that became the norm after
September 11th.24 2 Alshafei was Iraqi,24 3 and Albanna was re-
lated to one defendant in the Lackawanna Six case. 244 In addi-
tion, the Alshafei case arguably illustrates the disparate treatment
of small businesses and that of corporations that violate U.S.
trade embargoes.245
While arguments for racial profiling, or religious or na-
tional origin profiling, might be justified as a law enforcement
tool, it is important to consider the couple whose door was bro-
ken down by mistake at dawn, the old man who had a gun
pointed at his head or the women whose husbands disappeared
into detention.2 4 6 It is even questionable whether such profiling
is effective in detecting terrorist funding, given that no prosecu-
tions of hawala brokers involved in terrorism have taken place
238. See supra notes 158-61 and accompanying text (offering ways to regulate
hawala with less disruption).
239. See supra notes 41-64, 80-99 and accompanying text (discussing multiple rea-
sons that people use hawala networks).
240. See supra notes 196-204 and accompanying text (discussing Alshafei's tumultu-
ous life and motivation for hawala use).
241. See supra notes 79-88 and accompanying text (describing hawala use for those
who cannot otherwise contact relative due to political situations).
242. See supra note 218 and accompanying text (describing F.B.I. efforts to count
mosques and Muslims in select areas).
243. See supra notes 196-204 and accompanying text (describing Alshafei's Iraqi
background).
244. See supra note 213 and accompanying text (describing Albanna's relation to
Lackawanna Six).
245. See supra notes 205-06 and accompanying text (describing disparate treatment
for corporations and individuals who violate sanctions).
246. See supra note 129 and accompanying text (describing traditional law enforce-
ment efforts as flawed).
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despite three years of intense scrutiny.247
Focusing on Muslim hawala brokers provides a false sense of
security that the United States is making progress on the war on
terror.24 8 As mentioned above, many diaspora communities, not
just Middle Easterners, use hawala networks to send money to
family and relatives abroad. 24 9 Law enforcement officials vigor-
ously zeroed in on Muslim Americans, 250 although hawala and
hawala-networks do not belong exclusively to any one ethnic
group.251
C. International Cooperation
Given that a hawala transaction, by definition, involves bor-
ders, regulating it requires international cooperation.2 5 2 Hawala
transactions are conducted through code words that the U.S. law
enforcement officials may not have the language expertise to de-
cipher.253 Hawala transactions entail no direct physical move-
ment of money, so linking the illegal transactions to couriers
would be virtually impossible.254 Moreover, hawala brokers
might merely be links in an intricate network and while they
know their immediate contacts, they are not necessarily aware of
all the involved parties. 255 Attempts to regulate hawala networks
without the consensus and input of operators, users, in-
termediaries, and recipient Nations are not be likely to suc-
247. See supra note 187 and accompanying text (stating that most individuals utiliz-
ing hawala networks in United States are conducting non-terrorist activities).
248. See supra note 187 and accompanying text (describing lack of terrorist prose-
cutions).
249. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text (citing examples of multiple eth-
nic groups using hawala-like systems to send money to families).
250. See supra note 218 and accompanying text (describing F.B.I. efforts to count
mosques and Muslims in select areas).
251. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text (arguing that variations of
hawala are not limited to Middle Eastern countries).
252. See supra notes 161-69 and accompanying text (describing international coop-
eration as obstacle to regulating hawala).
253. See supra note 136 and accompanying text (discussing that hawala behavior
lies well outside the cultural experience of most U.S. investigators who are "baffled"
with Arabic names).
254. See supra note 157 and accompanying text (describing hawala networks as infi-
nite, elusive and labyrinth).
255. See supra notes 129, 157 and accompanying text (describing flawed law en-
forcement efforts).
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ceed.2 56
Moreover, the assumption that hawala networks should be
more internally regulated does not necessarily ring true in some
parts of the world. 257 As discussed above, the United Arab Emir-
ates openly defends the legitimacy of hawala networks.258 It has
attempted an approach that takes divergent economic and cul-
tural realities into account, 259 in contrast to the American black
and white shutdown of Al Barakaat. 261 These conflicting atti-
tudes pose obstacles for better hawala regulation.
Furthermore, countries believed to be at the epicenter of Al
Qaeda's re-emerging network, including Afghanistan, Somalia,
and Yemen are, at best, years away from establishing the finan-
cial and legal infrastructures needed to license, regulate, and
freeze terrorist assets. 261  As mentioned above, Afghanistan, a
country that has relied on hawala for years, just opened its first
international private-sector bank in September 2003.262 While
this bank will be able to take deposits and perform international
money transfers, the World Bank is skeptical about the prospects
of having legitimately-licensed and monitored hawala in Afghan-
istan. 2 " The U.S.-led efforts do not adequately consider the fact
that many countries simply lack the resources and infrastructure
to effectively regulate hawala networks. 264 The problem, then, is
whether the USA PATRIOT Act requirements are appropriate
for such economically deprived countries. While the United
States mandates elaborate compliance and identification verifi-
cation measures, these measures fail to reflect the reality that
256. See supra notes 148-56 and accompanying text (criticizing unilateral approach
to regulate hawala network).
257. See supra notes 148-56 and accompanying text (describing U.A.E.'s resistance
to some regulatory efforts).
258. See supra notes 151-61 and accompanying text (describing provisions of Abu
Dhabi Conference on Hawala).
259. See supra note 159 and accompanying text (describing U.A.E.'s efforts to posi-
tively use hawala system).
260. See supra notes 174-84 and accompanying text (discussing U.S. approach in
shutting down Al Barakaat hawala).
261. See supra notes 79-88 (describing infrastructural obstacles to regulating hawala
networks).
262. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text (describing Afghanistan banking
system).
263. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text (describing recent attempts to
modernize banking system in Afghanistan).
264. See supra notes 85, 138-42 and accompanying text (describing reality that
many Nations lack technical capacity to actually freeze funds).
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they can be implemented in other countries quickly. 65
Still another problem is that the PATRIOT Act regulations
and Operation Green Quest efforts have alienated needed part-
ners such as the United Arab Emirates.266 The governor of the
U.A.E. Central Bank publicly criticized the United States, saying
that it had failed to build the necessary global coalition by not
sharing information or offering enough financial and technical
assistance to developing Nations. 267 European countries, too,
have been critical of U.S.-led efforts. 68 The United States,
through its PATRIOT Act, forces its provisions on other coun-
tries rather than taking a diplomatic approach,269 thereby hin-
dering efforts at building international cooperation. 27 0  It is
probable that some of the efforts will worsen the increasingly
tense relationship between the United States and certain parts of
the world, which in turn will hamper regulatory attempts.
271
No efforts to regulate this inherently international problem
will be effective without coordinated international action. 2 7 2 It
makes little sense to have one law for the hawala remitter and a
separate one for the hawala recipient country.2 7 3 At present, the
U.S.-led efforts do not adequately consider the fact that many
countries simply do not have the resources, infrastructure or de-
sire to effectively regulate hawala.2 74
265. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text (describing worldwide use of
and reliance on hawala networks by diaspora communities).
266. See supra notes 161-68 and accompanying text (recognizing that regulating
hawala networks is dependent on collaborative work with multiple countries and juris-
dictions).
267. See supra notes 148-52 (criticizing U.S.-led approach).
268. See supra notes 162-65 and accompanying text (describing criticism of Ameri-
can-led efforts at regulating hawala).
269. See supra notes 157-60 and accompanying text (contrasting American "zero-
tolerance approach" with European approach).
270. See supra notes 161-67 and accompanying text (repeating sentiment that inter-
national cooperation is important and some USA PATRIOT Act provisions lack diplo-
macy).
271. See supra note 160 and accompanying text (arguing that such attempts may
generate ill-will and discontent with United States).
272. See supra notes 148-57, 157-61, 161-68 and accompanying text (describing
U.A.E.'s defense of hawala networks).
273. See supra notes 161-68 and accompanying text (describing international com-
ponent of hawala networks and need for international cooperation).
274. See supra notes 161-68 and accompanying text (discussing need for interna-
tional cooperation).
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D. Impact on Terrorism
The new reporting and licensing requirements for hawala
brokers will definitely help stop criminal activity.275 But it is
questionable whether the USA PATRIOT Act requirements will
make a permanent dent in terrorist financing, given that terror-
ist funding comes from multiple sources.276 As of July 31, 2003,
the U.S. government had only frozen U.S.$719,832 inAl Qaeda
assets.
27 7
In view of the fact that the September 11 th hijackers did not
extensively rely on hawala networks, some critics have posited
that hawala operators will not be greatly affected by the USA PA-
TRIOT Act regulations.278 More importantly, it is unlikely that
illegitimate hawala operators will even register.279 In other
words, by relying on the reporting requirements, law enforce-
ment authorities will pursue the immigrant offender who is eas-
ily detected rather than get at the root of clandestine money
laundering.2 ° It is noteworthy that the easily detected immi-
grant offenders such as Mohammed Albanna and Alshafei, have
mostly been of Middle Eastern descent.21
Arguably, the "success" of the Al Barakaat case should not
eclipse the fact that it disrupted a source of money for thousands
of people and failed to find any terrorists.28 2 Allowing law en-
forcement to seize on all hawala without distinguishing between
those who used hawala networks to send money to ailing rela-
tives or those with terrorist ambitions impinges on the rights of
many in the hopes of catching a few, something antithetical to
275. See supra notes 124-30 and accompanying text (stating successes of Operation
Green Quest).
276. See supra notes 104-09 (describing that terrorists disguise their work through
charities, informal banking systems, bulk cash and commodities such as precious stones
and metals).
277. See supra note 128 (noting amount of terrorist-related funds seized).
278. See supra notes 132-36 and accompanying text (describing how September
1lth hijackers used formal banks).
279. See supra notes 138-42 and accompanying text (stating that Afghani individu-
als have no incentive to declare their activities for external monitoring).
280. See supra note 129 and accompanying text (describing flaws with present law
enforcement efforts).
281. See supra notes 203-06, 216-21 and accompanying text (discussing reasons
such as racial profiling that law enforcement honed in on these suspects).
282. See supra notes 183-94 and accompanying text (discussing effect of Al Bara-
kaat shutdown).
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the notion of innocent until proven guilty. 283 The ends-justify-
the-means type of enforcement used in Al Barakaat case raises
the most basic questions about criminal law, such as whether it is
justifiable to punish certain offenders over others who evade de-
tection. 2 8 4
The efforts to require registration and to require them to
file suspicious activity reports will generate unmanageable quan-
tities of paperwork unless law enforcement takes steps to better
understand how hawala works. 2" Law enforcement officials
need to better distinguish between the use of hawala for remit-
tances, money laundering and terrorist purposes as they re-
present different degrees of criminal culpability.286 For now, it
appears that the USA PATRIOT Act provisions merely enhance
the prosecution and punishment of run-of-the-mill criminal of-
fenders, which pushes actual terrorists further underground.287
E. Attempts to Strengthen Hawala Regulations
It is too early to critique the VICTORY Act because it has
not been finalized, but it is important that its provisions be scru-
tinized and not rushed through Congress as was the USA PA-
TRIOT Act.288 One immediate concern is that under its new
provisions, someone completely unconnected to any terrorist
transaction may be arrested because the clause, "involves the
proceeds of' does not indicate how direct the involvement has to
be.2 89 Because illegal money taints legal money with which it is
mixed, every account containing dirty money is itself dirty
money.290 Relying on such a provision allows law enforcement
283. See supra note 129 and accompanying text (describing problem with broad
law enforcement policies).
284. See id. and accompanying text (describing problems with present law enforce-
ment efforts).
285. See supra notes 129-39 (arguing increased reporting requirements could hin-
der criminal investigations).
286. See supra notes 136-39 and accompanying text (noting that while some hawala
are used for illegal activity or to move terrorist funds, others are legitimately providing
much needed services).
287. See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text (arguing that attempts to
strictly regulate will provide incentives for more secrecy and resistance).
288. See supra note 111 and accompanying text (describing swift passage of USA
PATRIOT Act legislation).
289. See supra note 122 and accompanying text (describing broad language in VIC-
TORY Act provision).
290. See supra notes 126-28 (describing U.S.-led freezing efforts as successful).
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officials to presume that all hawala operations are linked to ter-
rorism, even if the link is tenuous.29' While this might lead to
more arrests, it ignores the distinction between hawala networks
used by terrorists versus non-terrorists. 2  Should someone who
had no connection to terrorist assets, who used the hawala to
send money home, be penalized to the same degree, particularly
since the curtailment of civil liberties by the PATRIOT and VIC-
TORY Acts is justified purely on grounds of national security and
terrorism?
F. An Alternative Approach
Outlawing hawala networks altogether, as in the Al Barakaat
case, is not the right answer.293 Hawala networks are ingrained
in various cultural groups, and serve legitimate needs, making it
unrealistic to eliminate them completely.294 Also, hawala net-
works have typically thrived in jurisdictions in which the formal
banking sector is absent or weak, or where significant distortions
exist in financial markets.295
Lawmakers must offer economic incentives to facilitate
cheap, fast remittances across international borders. 296 If hawala
users were adequately served by the formal banking system,297
they would rely less on hawala networks.
Furthermore, even though it is possible for criminals to
move money into the United States via hawala networks with lit-
tle or no trace, this money is useless unless it can be converted
into an acceptable form. 298 This requires a relationship between
banks and hawala networks, bringing at least some of the money
291. See supra note 129 and accompanying text (discussing broad law enforcement
efforts).
292. See supra notes 79-88, 97-106 and accompanying text (distinguishing between
hawala use for criminal purposes and for justifiable purposes).
293. See supra notes 183-91 and accompanying text (describing disruption for
many after Al Barakaat shutdown).
294. See supra notes 14-20 accompanying text (describing deep-rooted history of
hawala use).
295. See supra notes 79-92 and accompanying text (describing specific reasons for
heavy hawala use).
296. See supra notes 89, 159 and accompanying text (describing need for incentives
for people to switch to formal banking system).
297. See supra notes 72-78 and accompanying text (describing economic contribu-
tions through hawala networks).
298. See supra notes 102-06 (arguing that every informal money transaction inter-
faces with formal banking at some stage).
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into the formal banking sector.299 The sheer magnitude of the
amounts involved entails the collaboration of more established
Western financial institutions.
Thus, the United States should develop region-specific
hawala networks to compete with informal hawala networks.
They should target refugee or low-income immigrant communi-
ties and develop a hawala network in collaboration with other
jurisdictions. Western models of regulation are neither a guar-
antee of success nor appropriate for hawala regulation 00 and
law enforcement must work with hawala brokers, users and in-
termediaries to gain a better understanding of the intricacies of
their nature. 0 1
It is equally important to conduct public education cam-
paigns to inform people of the benefits of using licensed money
transfer systems.30 2 For many people, hawala is a longstanding
cultural tradition, and thus, it is not only important to regulate
hawala networks, but also to reform alternative remittance sys-
tems and educate people about them. 3 The United States
could ensure continuation of vital services and minimum disrup-
tion for populations who have no other way to send money
abroad.30 4 This culturally and economically sensitive approach
would offer tangible incentives to prompt people to switch to the
institutionalized banking system.30 5
CONCLUSION
It is too early to adequately evaluate the overall effectiveness
of the U.S.-led efforts to regulate hawala networks. Still, it is
299. See supra note 102 (noting that fund transfers rely on formal and informal
networks).
300. See supra notes 130-42, 148-52 and accompanying text (criticizing Western
regulatory efforts).
301. See supra note 159 and accompanying text (offering suggestions such as out-
reach and consultation to provide better insight into how to better understand hawala
relationships).
302. See supra notes 155, 159 and accompanying text (advocating more culturally
sensitive approach to hawala regulation in United Arab Emirates).
303. See supra notes 93-96, 159 and accompanying text (describing cultural and
religious reasons that some people use hawala networks and suggesting approaches on
how to regulate hawala for select populations).
304. See supra notes 183-91 and accompanying text (describing negative effects of
Al Barakaat shutdown).
305. See supra notes 138, 159 and accompanying text (urging for law enforcement
to consider incentives for hawala users).
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important to understand that hawala networks are too amor-
phous to control with traditional banking laws, too insular to eas-
ily infiltrate, and too enmeshed with other services to abolish
outright. 0 6 The laws must adapt to reflect the norms of the so-
cial groups that make up the United States, and it is imperative
that the United States take a more international, culturally sensi-
tive approach and offer incentives to convince people to switch
to a more formalized banking system."0 7
306. See supra notes 138-42 (reporting that other Nations have been unsuccessful
in regulating hawala networks).
307. See supra notes 138, 159 and accompanying text (advocating for balanced ap-
proach in regulating hawala networks).
